Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 20 (1.44 seconds)Section 42 in The Specific Relief Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Section 16 in The Specific Relief Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
The Limitation Act, 1963
Arjun Singh And Another vs Union Of India And Others on 29 July, 2010
17. It is no doubt true that if on a reading of the plaint it were clear that the
claim as raised therein is barred by limitation, clause (d) of Rule 11 of
Order 7 of the Code would empower the Court to reject the plaint. However,
it is settled law that if the question of limitation is connected or interwoven
with the merits of the case, the matter requires to be decided along with
the other issues and in such case clause (d) would have no application (see
AIR 1987 Delhi 165 : Arjun Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1995 Andhra
Pradesh 43 : Khaja Quthubullah v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, and
AIR 1999 Rajasthan 102 : Mohanlal Sukhadia University v. Priya
Solaman). In terms of Article 59 of the Limitation Act, the period of
limitation is three years from the date the facts entitling the plaintiff to
have the instrument cancelled or set aside first becomes known to him. It
is not known at this stage as to whether the opposite party no.1 or his
representative was allowed to peruse the alleged forged deed of gift dated
March 27, 1965 in course of proceedings before the Executive Officer of the
Municipality and thus became aware of the entire contents thereof or not.
The date on which the opposite party no.1 actually came to learn of such
alleged forged deed of gift and the extent of knowledge derived would be
decisive, which could only surface after evidence is led at the trial. The
controversy cannot be resolved at this stage without receiving evidence.
The opposite party no.1 has averred in the plaint that she came to learn of
the fraud that had been committed after receiving the certified copy on
June 13, 1995. Such averment has to be treated as correct since while
reading a plaint for deciding whether it deserves rejection or not on
application of the terms of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code or not, nothing can
be added or subtracted. The contention of Mr. Roy Chowdhury that the
suit is barred by limitation does not appeal to me, at least at this stage, to
warrant an order for rejection of the plaint.
Khaja Quthubullah vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh And Others on 8 July, 1994
17. It is no doubt true that if on a reading of the plaint it were clear that the
claim as raised therein is barred by limitation, clause (d) of Rule 11 of
Order 7 of the Code would empower the Court to reject the plaint. However,
it is settled law that if the question of limitation is connected or interwoven
with the merits of the case, the matter requires to be decided along with
the other issues and in such case clause (d) would have no application (see
AIR 1987 Delhi 165 : Arjun Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1995 Andhra
Pradesh 43 : Khaja Quthubullah v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, and
AIR 1999 Rajasthan 102 : Mohanlal Sukhadia University v. Priya
Solaman). In terms of Article 59 of the Limitation Act, the period of
limitation is three years from the date the facts entitling the plaintiff to
have the instrument cancelled or set aside first becomes known to him. It
is not known at this stage as to whether the opposite party no.1 or his
representative was allowed to peruse the alleged forged deed of gift dated
March 27, 1965 in course of proceedings before the Executive Officer of the
Municipality and thus became aware of the entire contents thereof or not.
The date on which the opposite party no.1 actually came to learn of such
alleged forged deed of gift and the extent of knowledge derived would be
decisive, which could only surface after evidence is led at the trial. The
controversy cannot be resolved at this stage without receiving evidence.
The opposite party no.1 has averred in the plaint that she came to learn of
the fraud that had been committed after receiving the certified copy on
June 13, 1995. Such averment has to be treated as correct since while
reading a plaint for deciding whether it deserves rejection or not on
application of the terms of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code or not, nothing can
be added or subtracted. The contention of Mr. Roy Chowdhury that the
suit is barred by limitation does not appeal to me, at least at this stage, to
warrant an order for rejection of the plaint.
Mohan Lal Sukhadia University, Udaipur vs Miss. Priya Soloman on 4 January, 1999
17. It is no doubt true that if on a reading of the plaint it were clear that the
claim as raised therein is barred by limitation, clause (d) of Rule 11 of
Order 7 of the Code would empower the Court to reject the plaint. However,
it is settled law that if the question of limitation is connected or interwoven
with the merits of the case, the matter requires to be decided along with
the other issues and in such case clause (d) would have no application (see
AIR 1987 Delhi 165 : Arjun Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1995 Andhra
Pradesh 43 : Khaja Quthubullah v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, and
AIR 1999 Rajasthan 102 : Mohanlal Sukhadia University v. Priya
Solaman). In terms of Article 59 of the Limitation Act, the period of
limitation is three years from the date the facts entitling the plaintiff to
have the instrument cancelled or set aside first becomes known to him. It
is not known at this stage as to whether the opposite party no.1 or his
representative was allowed to peruse the alleged forged deed of gift dated
March 27, 1965 in course of proceedings before the Executive Officer of the
Municipality and thus became aware of the entire contents thereof or not.
The date on which the opposite party no.1 actually came to learn of such
alleged forged deed of gift and the extent of knowledge derived would be
decisive, which could only surface after evidence is led at the trial. The
controversy cannot be resolved at this stage without receiving evidence.
The opposite party no.1 has averred in the plaint that she came to learn of
the fraud that had been committed after receiving the certified copy on
June 13, 1995. Such averment has to be treated as correct since while
reading a plaint for deciding whether it deserves rejection or not on
application of the terms of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code or not, nothing can
be added or subtracted. The contention of Mr. Roy Chowdhury that the
suit is barred by limitation does not appeal to me, at least at this stage, to
warrant an order for rejection of the plaint.
Mst. Rukhmabai vs Lala Laxminarayan And Others on 17 November, 1959
18. In so far as the contention based on Section 34 of the Act is concerned, I
do not consider it to be worthy enough for directing rejection of the plaint
at this stage based on the authority of the decision of the Supreme Court
reported in AIR 1960 SC 335 : Mst. Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan &
ors. There a similar objection referring to Section 42 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1877, which is pari materia Section 34 of the Act, was raised for
consideration. It was ruled as follows: