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1 - 10 of 21 (0.25 seconds)Section 133 in The Indian Contract Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
The Limitation Act, 1963
Jagdish Prasad Sarda vs Allahabad Bank on 28 August, 2020
30. We next come to yet another limb of argument raised by the Appellant
that the present petition was time-barred and not maintainable when seen in
the context of the Deed of Guarantee of 2009. It was contended that in terms of
the Contract Act, once the parties alter the contract, the original contract need
not be performed. When the substance of the original agreement is substantially
altered, the original agreement no longer can be held to exist. It was submitted
that as the Appellant stood discharged from the Deed of Guarantee of 2009
because of the material variations caused thereto on account of the
Supplementary Guarantee of 2014, no Section 95 petition could be raised basis
default of Deed of Guarantee of 2009 as it would be hit by the period of limitation
of three years in terms of Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Attention was also
adverted to the decision of this Tribunal in Jagdish Prasad Sarda Vs
Allahabad Bank in CA(AT)(Ins) No. 183 of 2020 wherein it has been held that
the period of limitation commences from the date of declaration of NPA.
Contention had been raised that since the default in the present case had
occurred on 25.07.2018 which was the date of NPA, while the Section 95
application was filed on 26.05.2022, it clearly surpassed three years and hence
Page 26 of 30
Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 512 of 2024
stood time-barred. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Babulal Vardharji judgement supra in which it has been
held that the IBC does not intend to give a new lease of life to time-barred debts.
Article 137 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 129 in The Indian Contract Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 3 in The Indian Contract Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
H R Parvathi vs The Manager Canara Bank on 7 April, 2010
In support of their contention reliance
has been placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sitaram
Gupta Vs Punjab National Bank (2008) 5 SCC 711 and in H.R. Basavaraj Vs
Canara Bank (2010) 12 SCC 458 in which it was held that when a party enters
into a guarantee with a bank which is in the nature of continuing guarantee, the
guarantee was to continue and remain in operation for all subsequent
transactions. The plea taken by the Appellant of novation of contract following
the execution of the Supplemental Deed of Guarantee of 2014 was opposed as
misconceived.
M. S. Anirudhan vs The Thomco'S Bank Ltd on 14 February, 1962
In support of their contention, reliance
has been placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.S.
Anirudhan Vs Thomco's Bank Ltd., AIR 1963 SC 746 and in Ram Khilona
& Ors. Vs Sardar & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 2548 wherein it was held that the
effect of making an alteration in a Deed of Guarantee after its execution without
the consent of the party is exactly the same as that of cancelling the deal. In the
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Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 512 of 2024
present case, it was contended that since the alteration made in the subsequent
guarantees were substantially material as it enhanced the guaranteed amount
without the consent of the Appellant, the Appellant stood discharged under the
Guarantee Deed of 25.08.2009 and Section 95 petition could not have been
initiated basis the Guarantee Deed of 25.08.2009.
Ram Khilona & Ors vs Sardar & Ors on 16 July, 2002
In support of their contention, reliance
has been placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.S.
Anirudhan Vs Thomco's Bank Ltd., AIR 1963 SC 746 and in Ram Khilona
& Ors. Vs Sardar & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 2548 wherein it was held that the
effect of making an alteration in a Deed of Guarantee after its execution without
the consent of the party is exactly the same as that of cancelling the deal. In the
Page 14 of 30
Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 512 of 2024
present case, it was contended that since the alteration made in the subsequent
guarantees were substantially material as it enhanced the guaranteed amount
without the consent of the Appellant, the Appellant stood discharged under the
Guarantee Deed of 25.08.2009 and Section 95 petition could not have been
initiated basis the Guarantee Deed of 25.08.2009.