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1 - 10 of 34 (0.56 seconds)Section 27 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 3 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 24 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 34 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Kashmira Singh vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 4 March, 1952
It would be noticed that as a result of the provisions
contained in Section 30, the confession has no doubt to
be regarded as amounting to evidence in a general
way, because whatever is considered by the court is
evidence; circumstances which are considered by the
court as well as probabilities do amount to evidence in
that generic sense. Thus, though confession may be
regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of
the provisions of Section 30, the fact remains that it is
not evidence as defined by Section 3 of the Act. The
result, therefore, is that in dealing with a case against
an accused person, the court cannot start with the
24 1930 SCC OnLine Mad 86 : ILR (1931) 54 Mad 75 at p. 77
25 1949 SCC OnLine PC 12 : (1948-49) 76 IA 147 at p. 155
Cr.A.Nos.1202/2014, 1160/2014 & 1143/2014
Page 35 of 38
confession of a co-accused person; it must begin with
other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it
has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and
effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn
to the confession in order to receive assurance to the
conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to
reach on the said other evidence. That, briefly stated,
is the effect of the provisions contained in Section 30.
The same view has been expressed by this Court in
Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P. (supra) where the
decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu case
(supra) has been cited with approval."
Selvi & Ors vs State Of Karnataka & Anr on 5 May, 2010
"21. As regards the recovery of incriminating material at
the instance of the accused, the Investigating Officer K.D.
Sonakiya, PW35, has categorically deposed that all the
confessions by the accused persons were made after
interrogation, but the mode of this interrogation does not
appear to be of normal character, inasmuch as he himself
has deposed that the accused persons were further grilled
and interrogated multiple times before extracting the
confessions which lead to the recovery of the ornaments,
cash, weapons and key. We find from the totality of facts
and circumstances that the confessions that led to the
18 (2010) 7 SCC 263
Cr.A.Nos.1202/2014, 1160/2014 & 1143/2014
Page 22 of 38
recovery of the incriminating material were not voluntary,
but caused by inducement, pressure or coercion. Once a
confessional statement of the accused on facts is found to
be involuntary, it is hit by Article 20(3) of the Constitution,
rendering such a confession inadmissible. There is an
embargo on accepting selfincriminatory evidence, but if it
leads to the recovery of material objects in relation to a
crime, it is most often taken to hold evidentiary value as per
the circumstances of each case. However, if such a
statement is made under undue pressure and compulsion
from the investigating officer, as in the present matter, the
evidentiary value of such a statement leading to the
recovery is nullified. It is noteworthy to reproduce the
observations of this Court regarding the relationship
between Section 27 of the Evidence Act and Article 20(3)
of the Constitution in Selvi v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 7
SCC 263: