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1 - 4 of 4 (0.23 seconds)Haji Sheikh Wahid-Uddin vs B. Makhan Lal And Anr. on 4 May, 1938
2. It was contended before the lower Court that the applicants were entitled to have this decree amended under Act IV of 1938 on the basis that the award was a renewal of the pre-existing liability which went back to a number of separate advances at different dates. This contention was met by two objections, firstly, that the contesting respondent was a scheduled bank and that the rate of interest did not exceed nine per cent. so that the transaction was protected by Section 10 (2) (iii) of Act IV of 1938, and secondly that the award affects property outside the Madras Presidency which is not amenable to legislation passed by the Madras Provincial Legislature, and that the award as a whole must therefore be outside the scope of that legislation. The lower Court, relying on the decision in Wahid-ud-din v. Makhan Lal I.L.R. (1938) All. 781, gave effect to this latter contention and dismissed the petition. In the view which we take it is not necessary for us to go into the correctness of the decision of the lower Court on this part of the case. We are of opinion that on a correct view of the transaction the respondent is entitled to the protection of Section 10 (2) (iii) of the Act.
Budiredla Ramamurti vs Matta Sitaramayya on 11 April, 1940
3. We have held in Ramamurti v. Sitaramayya (1940) 2 M.L.J. 293 : I.L.R. (1940) Mad. that when there is a decree based on a compromise, it is the compromise which is the contract, the liability under which has to be scaled down and if that compromise can be shown to be a renewal of a pre-existing liability arising before 1st October, 1932, then the debtor would be entitled to go back to that pre-existing liability under the terms of Section 8 of the Act. It has been objected that an award passed on an agreement of the parties to refer their dispute to an arbitrator stands on a different footing from a compromise upon which a decree is based. We are of opinion that, at any rate, for the purpose of the application of Act IV of 1938, such an award is the starting point of a new liability embodied in the decree which can only be re-opened under the Act on the looting that it is a renewal or inclusion in a fresh document of a pre-existing debt.
S. Subramania Aiyar vs The India Equitable Insurance Company ... on 30 July, 1941
It was held by one of us in Subramania Iyer v. India Equitable Insurance Co., Ltd. (1941) 2 M.L.J. 509, that where there was a debt due to a scheduled bank, carrying interest at nine per cent., which itself was a renewal of a pre-existing debt carrying interest at more than nine per cent. the bank was entitled to the protection of Section 10 (2) (iii). The reasoning of that decision was that the debtors are not entitled to call in aid the provisions of Section 8 for the purpose of showing that the ultimate debt is one to which the provisions of Section 8 have to be applied. In deciding the question whether the liability is one bearing interest at not more than nine per cent. per annum the Court has to look to the actual liability sought to be scaled down and cannot take into consideration any pre-existing liability, which only becomes relevant if and when it has been found that the provisions of Act IV have to be applied to the debt.
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