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Rangappa vs Sri Mohan on 7 May, 2010

"14. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the respondent­claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the 1In Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441 the Supreme Court observed that "since the accused did admit that the signature on the cheque was his, the statutory presumption comes into play.."(SCC @p. 454) CC No. 902/11 PEC Ltd. v. Shree Sainath Wires Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Page 7 of 16 impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) may not be correct. However, this does not in any way cast doubt on the correctness of the decision in that case since it was based on the specific facts and circumstances therein. As noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of 'preponderance of probabilities'. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own. " (emphasis added)
Supreme Court of India Cites 11 - Cited by 9567 - K G Balakrishnan - Full Document

M/S. Mojj Engineering Systems Ltd. & ... vs M/S A.B. Sugars Ltd. on 29 September, 2008

20.It has further been contended on behalf of accused persons that the cheque in question was handed over in the year 2008 and therefore, it was drawn in the year 2008 and not in the year 2010. The said contention of the accused persons is not acceptable in view of Section 118 (b) of the NI Act which provides for the presumption that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date. Therefore, it has to be presumed that the cheque in question was drawn on 31.03.2010. Section 20 of the NI Act provides for implied authority given to the holder to fill the contents of the cheque. It clearly states that the person signing the inchoate negotiable instrument shall be liable upon such instrument, in the capacity in which he signed the same, to CC No. 902/11 PEC Ltd. v. Shree Sainath Wires Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Page 9 of 16 any holder in due course. (See also MOJJ Engineering System Ltd. v. A.B. Sugars Ltd. 154 (2008) DLT 579). Section 20 of NI Act recognises the right of a payee to put date on the cheque if the drawer hands over incomplete negotiable instrument to him. Reading Section 20 of the NI Act read with Section 118(b) of the NI Act, the accused company had given authority to the complainant to fill up the date and the cheque in question was drawn on the date of the cheque i.e. 31.03.2010.
Delhi High Court Cites 19 - Cited by 223 - S K Misra - Full Document
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