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1 - 8 of 8 (0.45 seconds)The Amending Act, 1897
Madamanchi Ramappa & Anr vs Muthalur Bojjappa on 29 March, 1963
To the same effect are the judgments reported in Sri Sinha
Ramanuja Jeer Swamigal v. Sri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer alias Emberumanar
Jeer & Ors. [AIR 1961 SC 1720], V.Ramachandra Ayyar & Anr. v.
Ramalingam Chettiar & Anr.[AIR 1963 SC 302] and Madamanchi Ramappa &
Anr. v. Muthaluru Bojjappa [AIR 1963 SC 1633]. After its amendment,
this Court in various judgments held that the existence of the
substantial question of law is a condition precedent for the High Court
to assume jurisdiction of entertaining the second appeal. The
conditions specified in Section 100 of the Code are required to be
strictly fulfilled and that the second appeal cannot be decided on
merely equitable grounds.
Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs Savitkibai Sopan Gujar An Dors on 16 April, 1999
In Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar & Ors. [JT 1999
(3) SC 163] this Court again considered this aspect of the matter and
held:
Pares Nath Thakur vs Smt. Mohani Dasi And Others on 12 May, 1959
Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred
to as "the Code") was amended by the Amending Act No.104 of 1976 making
it obligatory upon the High Court to entertain the second appeal only
if it was satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of
law. Such question of law has to be precisely stated in the Memorandum
of Appeal and formulated by the High Court in its judgment, for
decision. The appeal can be heard only on the question, so formulated,
giving liberty to the respondent to argue that the case before the High
Court did not involve any such question. The Amending Act was
introduced on the basis of various Law Commission Reports recommending
for making appropriate provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure which
were intended to minimise the litigation, to give the litigant fair
trial in accordance with the accepted principles of natural justice, to
expedite the disposal of civil suits and proceedings so that justice is
not delayed, to avoid complicated procedure, to ensure fair deal to the
poor sections of the community and restrict the second appeals only on
such questions which are certified by the courts to be substantial
question of law. We have noticed with distress that despite amendment,
the provisions of Section 100 of the Code have been liberally construed
and generously applied by some judges of the High Courts with the
result that objective intended to be achieved by the amendment of
Section 100 appears to have been frustrated. Even before the amendment
of Section 100 of the Code, the concurrent finding of facts could not
be disturbed in the second appeal. This Court in Paras Nath Thakur v.
Smt.Mohani Dasi (Deceased) & Ors. [AIR 1959 SC 1204] held:
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
K.S. Vidyanadam And Ors vs Vairavan on 6 February, 1997
In K.S. Vidyanadam & Ors. v. Vairavan [1997 (3) SCC 1] this Court
held:
Sri Sinna Ramanuja Jeer And Others vs Sri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer And Another on 27 April, 1961
To the same effect are the judgments reported in Sri Sinha
Ramanuja Jeer Swamigal v. Sri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer alias Emberumanar
Jeer & Ors. [AIR 1961 SC 1720], V.Ramachandra Ayyar & Anr. v.
Ramalingam Chettiar & Anr.[AIR 1963 SC 302] and Madamanchi Ramappa &
Anr. v. Muthaluru Bojjappa [AIR 1963 SC 1633]. After its amendment,
this Court in various judgments held that the existence of the
substantial question of law is a condition precedent for the High Court
to assume jurisdiction of entertaining the second appeal. The
conditions specified in Section 100 of the Code are required to be
strictly fulfilled and that the second appeal cannot be decided on
merely equitable grounds.
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