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Union Of India vs Mohindra Supply Company on 5 September, 1961

"Section 39 of the Arbitration Act came up for consideration in Union of India v. Mohlndra Supply Co. The Court after going into detail and examining various authorities given by different High Courts held that no second appeal lay under section 39(2) against a decision given by a learned single Judge under section 39(1). In respect of the Jurisdiction under Letters Patent the Court observed that since Arbitration Act was a consolidating and amending Act relating to arbitration it must be construed without any assumption that it was not Intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The Court held that in view of bar created by sub-section (2) of section 39 debarring any second appeal from an order passed in appeal under sub-section (1) the 'conclusion was inevitable that it was so done with a view to restrict the right of appeal within strict limits defined by section 39'. Therefore, so far the second part is concerned, namely, the maintainability of the appeal under Letters Patent it stands concluded by this decision."
Supreme Court of India Cites 19 - Cited by 178 - J C Shah - Full Document

Secretary To The Govt. Of Orissa & Anr vs Sarbeswar Rout on 4 October, 1989

In order therefore to find out as to whether arbitral proceedings as indicated in section 85 of 1996 Act had commenced prior to the coming into force of 1996 Act we have to find out whether prior to 26th January 1996 when 1996 Act had come into force, in terms of the ratio laid down in the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Sarbeswar Rout (supra) the Arbitrators had rendered upon the reference by Indicating their willingness to act as such. Applicability of section 21 of 1996 Act is not relevant in our case for determining the commencement of arbitral proceedings because section 21 of 1996 Act relates to and deals with the commencement of arbitral proceedings under 1996 Act. The definition of "commencement of arbitral proceedings" as occurring in section 21 of 1996 Act will have a bearing only to a point of time after 1996 Act had come into force and will have no relation to the commencement of arbitral proceedings at a point of time before 1996 Act had come into force. We are saying so because section 21 does not deal with the scope of commencement of arbitral proceedings under Arbitration Act 1940. On the other hand when section 85 of 1996 Act talks about the commencement of arbitral proceedings before the coming into force of 1996 Act, it clearly means that the arbitral proceedings should have commenced before the coming into force of 1996 Act, in the manner such commencement is understood under the Arbitration Act, 1940. The expression used in section 85, viz. "which commenced before this Act came into force" clearly and conclusively suggests that the principles governing the scope of commencement of arbitral proceedings as were applicable under 1940 Act were to be applied for understanding as to whether 1996 Act would have repealed 1940 Act with respect of such proceedings or not. We are therefore clearly of the opinion that section 21 of 1996 Act will have no manner of application to decide and determine whether the arbitral proceedings had commenced before the coming into force of 1996 Act or not. We are saying so far a very logical and valid reason. It arbitral proceedings as contemplated under the Arbitration Act, 1940 had commenced before the coming Into force of 1996 Act, in terms of section 85 thereof, this Act will have no application and the provisions of the arbitration Act 1940 will have applicability. But if the proceedings in terms of and as contemplated under the Arbitration Act 1940 had not commenced before the coming Into force of 1996 Act, undoubtedly 1996 Act would apply. With utmost respect therefore we have no hesitation in saying that Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Shetty's Construction(P) Ltd. , while noticing section 21 of 1996 Act had no occasion to deal with this particular aspect of the matter, peculiar to the facts of our case because of the claim of the appellants that the provisions of Arbitration Act 1940 are attracted in this Case.
Supreme Court of India Cites 12 - Cited by 20 - L M Sharma - Full Document
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