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Anandji Haridas & Co. Pvt. Ltd vs Engineering Mazdoor Sangh & Anr on 13 February, 1975

21. As a general principle of interpretation, where the words of a statute are plain, precise and unambiguous, the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language of the statute itself and no external evidence, such as Parliamentary Debates, Reports of the Committees of the Legislature or even the statement made by the Minister on the introduction of a measure or by the framers of the Act is admissible to construe those words. It is only where the statute is not exhaustive or where its language is ambiguous, uncertain, clouded or susceptible of more than one meaning or shades of meaning that external evidence as to the evils, if any, which the statute was intended to remedy, or of the circumstances which led to the passing to the statute may be looked into for the purpose of ascertaining the object which the Legislature had in view in using the words in question. If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, they are bound to be construed in their ordinary meanings. (See Anandji Haridas & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Engineering Mazdoor Sangh, AIR 1975 SC 946 and Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1976 SC 331).
Supreme Court of India Cites 8 - Cited by 47 - Full Document

Carew And Company Ltd vs Unlon Of India on 22 August, 1975

If the language used in a statute can be construed widely so as to salvage the remedial intendment, the court must adopt it. When two interpretations are feasible, that which advances the remedy and suppresses the evil as the Legislature envisioned must find favour with the court. (See Carew and Company Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260). Ordinarily, a court cannot cut down the definitional amplitude given in a statute.
Supreme Court of India Cites 18 - Cited by 64 - K K Mathew - Full Document

State Of West Bengal vs Sudhir Chandra Ghose & Ors on 9 November, 1976

(See State of West Bengal v. Sudhir Chandra Ghose AIR 1976 SC 2599). It would not be just and proper, therefore, to cut down the amplitude of the expression 'any land' in Section 4(4) of the Act by saying that in accordance with the other provisions of the statute, this can only mean agricultural land or land which can be consolidable although one cannot be oblivious of the well settled rule of interpretation that the court is entitled and indeed, bound when construing the terms of any provision in a statute, to construe any other part of the Act which throws light on the intention of the Legislature and it may show that the particular provision ought not to be construed as it would be alone and apart from the rest of the Act. It is well settled that a statutory provision cannot be interpreted in a way which defeats the very object of the Act. It is equally well settled that the Legislature does not waste words or introduce useless or redundant provisions.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 12 - H R Khanna - Full Document
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