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Vishwa And Co. vs State Of Gujarat on 13 October, 1965 cites

Ramavatar Budhaiprasad Etc vs Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola on 14 March, 1961

(4) Now turning to the construction of the words "domestic electrical appliances". It is a well settled rule of construction of sales tax statutes that words used by the Legislature in entries in various Schedules to describe different kinds of goods for prescribing different rates of tax should be construed not in any technical or scientific sense but as understood in common parlance. The words "domestic electrical appliances" must therefore be construed according to their popular sense, meaning that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it". See Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola, 1961-12 STC 286: (AIR 1961 SC 1325). Now what is the sense in which the words "domestic electrical appliances' are understood in common parlance? No better guidance can be found on this point than in Encyclopaedia Britannica an when we turn to that famous work we find that "domestic appliances' are equated with household appliances and under the heading of " household .Appliances" we find the following passage which throws considerable light on what are domestic appliances, electrical as well as non-electrical:
Supreme Court of India Cites 5 - Cited by 334 - J L Kapur - Full Document

Pashabhai Patel & Co. (P.) Ltd. vs Collector Of Sales Tax, Maharashtra ... on 18 March, 1963

(5) We find that the test of principal or primary use was first enunciated by the Maharashtra high Court in Pashabhai Patel and Co. (P) Ltd, v Collector of Sales Tax, Maharashtra State, (1964) 15 STC 32 (Bom). In that case the question was whether a tractor was agricultural machinery within the meaning of Entry 9 of Schedule B to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953. The argument of the assessee was that a tractor was machinery generally used for agricultural purposes and was therefore agricultural machinery within the meaning of Entry 9 of Schedule B. This argument was rejected by the Maharashtra High Court which took the view that though a tractor may be used for the purpose of agriculture, that was not the principal or primary purpose of a tractor, since a tractor was used for may purpose other than agriculture such as "pushing down trees, pushing large piles of dirt or rocks, or loading scrappers and operating of steep grades or against the high rolling resistance of soft roads clearing an grubbing involving a complete disposal of all timber, roots and brush from the vicinity of operations clearing small trees, for pulling or pushing loads, clearing jungles, ploughing kans lands, digging canals or building dams, roads and pipe lines or for moving earth for soil erosion or flood control, etc". The Maharashtra High Court held that the principal and primary use of a tractor was not for agriculture and therefore a tractor could not be called on agriculture machinery within the meaning affinity 9 of Schedule B. The Maharashtra High Court thus laid down the test of principal or primary user and applied it in determining the question before it. This decision was strongly relied on by Mr. S.L. Mody on behalf of the assessee.
Bombay High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Mahomed Tayoob Daruwala vs The State Of Bombay on 21 January, 1960

(10) Now, in order to understand the meaning and effect of Section 16(5) we will first take a case covered by clause (1)(b) of that sub-section where the amount of tax is assessed for any period under Section 14 or 15 and is unpaid. The prescribed time for the purpose of section 16(4) in such a case would be clearly the time prescribed under Section 16(5). That is now well settled by the decision of the Bombay High Court in Mahomed Tayoob Daruwala v. State of Bombay, 1960-11 STC 612 (Bom). In that case the assessee contended that by reason of the definition contained in Section 2 (10), the expression "prescribed" meant prescribed under the rules and since there was no provision in the rules prescribing the time for payment of tax assessed under Section 14 or 15, there was no prescribed time within the meaning of Section 16(4) and the taxing authorities had, therefore, no power to levy penalty for non-payment or late payment of tax after assessment. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of S.T. Desai and V.S. Desai JJ., negatived this contention holding that sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 16 must be read together and if they were so read it was clear that the Legislature itself had prescribed in sub section (5) of Section 16 time for payment of the tax assessed under Sections 14 and 15 and therefore default in paying the amount of the tax assessed within the time specified in the notice issued under S. 16, sub-section (5), would invite the operation of Section 16, sub-section (4). The Division Bench pointed out that the Legislature, when it states that a particular act or thing shall be done within a prescribed time, may leave the matter of prescribing the time to the rule-making authority or it may itself in the very provision or in some other provision in the enactment itself prescribe the time for the doing or performance of that act. There is no principle or drafting and no rule which prevents the Legislature itself from prescribing the time for the doing or performance of any act or discharging any duty simply because it speaks of a prescribed time and in the definition clause it has said that the expression "prescribed" shall mean "prescribed under the rules". It was, therefore, held that in the case of tax assessed under Section 14 or 15, "prescribed time" within the meaning of Section 16 sub-section (4) was time prescribed under Section 16 sub-section (5). Now, if Section 16 sub-section (5) prescribes the time for payment of the amount of the tax in case of tax assessed under Section 14 or 15, it is difficult to imagine that so far as the amount of tax due according to the return is concerned, the sub-section does not perform the function of prescribing the time for payment of the amount of the tax but merely lays down a condition precedent which must be fulfilled before the amount of tax remaining unpaid can be recovered as an arrear of land revenue. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to conceive of any reason which could have induced the Legislature to give time to the assessee to make payment of the amount of tax due according to the return before proceeding to recover it as an arrear of land revenue, if the assessee was already in default and had rendered himself liable to penalty under Section 16 sub-section (4). Ordinarily recoverability would follow as soon as default is made and there would be no point in postponing recoverability when default is already made and penalty has started running. It would indeed be a strange scheme which entitles a defaulting assessee against whom penalty is mounting from day to day to a minimum of thirty days time within which to pay up the amount of the tax and even to obtain extension of time and also instalments before any steps can be taken to recover the amount of the tax from him, as an arrear of land revenue. Moreover it is difficult to appreciate why an assessee should be made liable to running penalty when he has sufficient reasons for not being able to pay the amount of the tax which would entitle him to extension of time even beyond the period of not less than thirty days given by the notice under Section 16 sub-section (5) and also to instalments. The only rational and intelligible way of construing Section 16 sub-section (5) is by taking the view that as an in the case of the amount of tax assessed under Section 14 or 15, so also in the case of the amount of tax due according to the return when the return is furnished without full payment of such amount the Legislature provided that a notice of at least thirty days should be given to the assessee for payment of the amount of tax before any consequences arising from default, either by way of penalty or proceedings for recovery, should be visited on him. But then, it was urged on behalf of the revenue, if such were the intention of the Legislature, why should Section 16, sub-section (2) have provided that the assessee shall before furnishing the return pay the full amount of tax due from him according to the return. The answer is simple. It was necessary to make this provision in order to declare the liability of the assessee to make payment of the full amount of tax due from him according to the return and it was because this liability was imposed on the assessee that the Collector could be empowered under Section 16(5) to issue a notice calling upon the assessee to pay up the amount of the tax remaining unpaid. If Section 16(2) were not enacted declaring the liability of the assessee, the Collector could not possibly have demanded payment of the amount of tax due from the assessee according to the return and would have had to wait until the assessment was made. It is, therefore, clear that Section 16(2) merely declares the liability of the assessee to pay the amount of tax due according to the return before furnishing the return and where the return is furnished without payment of the full amount of tax due according to the return. Section 16(5) prescribes the time within which the amount of tax due according to the return or the balance thereof, remaining unpaid should be paid by the assessee on pain of incurring penalty under Section 16(4) and recovery proceedings being initiated under Section 16(5), and consequently no liability to penalty would be incurred by the assessee unless notice is issued to him under Section 16(5) and he makes default in complying with such notice.
Bombay High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

B.V. Aswathiah & Brothers vs Commercial Tax Officer, Vii Circle, ... on 24 July, 1962

(11) This is the view which we are inclined to take on principle but we find we are fortified in this view by a decision of the Mysore High Court in B.V. Aswathiah and Brothers v. Commercial Tax Officer, (1963) 14 STC 467 (Mys), where construing a similar provision made in Section 13 of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957 read with the second proviso to Rule 18 of the Rules made under that Act, the Mysore High Court took the view that in the case of tax due according to the return filed by the assessee, the assessee could be said to have committed default in making payment of the amount of tax within the prescribed time only if the assessee failed to comply with the notice issued under the second proviso to Rule 18 and non-payment of the amount of tax before filing of the return did not attract the applicability of the penal provision contained in Section 13(2). Section 13(2) of the Mysore Act corresponds our Section 16(4) and the second proviso to Rule 18 corresponds to our sub-section (5) of Section 16. This decision based on an allied provision considerably supports the view which we are taking on a construction of the provision of `tion 16.
Karnataka High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 4 - K S Hegde - Full Document

The State Of Mysore vs Santoomal Kishnomal on 23 January, 1962

As against this decision Mr. A.D. Desai on behalf of the revenue cited before us a decision of the Mysore High Court in State of Mysore v Santoomal Kishnomal, (1962) 13 STC 313 (Mys.) where the question was whether a crowbar is an agricultural implement exempted from sales tax under Schedule III of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1948, and a Division bench held that it is an agricultural implement. The Mysore High Court observed:
Karnataka High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 6 - K S Hegde - Full Document
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