Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 15 (0.26 seconds)Section 151 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Abdul Majid vs Jawahir Lal on 5 August, 1910
6. The learned counsel also relied on the decision in Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal, ILR 36 All 350 = (AIR 1914 PC 66) but that was a case where an appeal had been dismissed for default and the Division Bench itself has pointed out in Kikabhai's case, ILR (1940) Nag 496 = (AIR 1937 Nag 381) (supra) that the rule does not apply to cases where the appellate Court did not deal with the merits of the case as in the case of simply dismissing the appeal for default.
Collector Of Customs, Calcutta vs East India Commercial Co. Ltd on 30 April, 1962
7. It is now well settled that if once an order of an original authority is taken up in
appeal to the appellate authority it is the order of the appellate authority which is the operative order after the appeal is disposed of, whether the appeal reverses, modifies or confirms the order of the original authority by dismissing the appeal: see Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. Calcutta, AIR 1963 SC 1124. And, in our opinion, there is no difference whether the appeal is dismissed after notice or without notice, provided always that the dismissal is on merits.
Bhagubhai Dullabhabhai Bhandari vs The District Magistrate, Thana& ... on 8 May, 1956
Indeed, in Bhagubhai Dullabhabhai Bhandari v. The District Magistrate, Thana, 1956 SCR 533 = (AIR 1956 SC 585) where the Supreme Court had refused to grant special leave to appeal to a petitioner-accused, it was held that he could not re-agitate the matter under Article 32 of the Constitution for the reason that the petitioner's conviction stood 'confirmed' as a result of the refusal by the Supreme Court to grant him special leave to appeal from the judgment of the High Court.
Doma Choudhary And Ors. vs Ram Naresh Lal And Ors. on 7 November, 1958
"Order 9, Rule 9 cannot, therefore, be invoked for setting aside the dismissal in default of an application for restoration of a suit under that Rule. On the same principle an order dismissing in default an application for restoration of a suit under Order 9, Rule 9 is not open to appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(c). The dismissal of such an application for default is in the exercise of the inherent powers of the Court. That being so, the dismissal can be set aside by the exercise of the same inherent powers. It seems to us unnecessary to examine some decisions in
which it has been held that an appeal lies under Order 43 Rule 1(c) from an order rejecting for default an application under Rule 9, (see Doma Choudhary v. Ram Naresh Lal, AIR 1959 Pat 121 and cases noted in Chituley's Civil Procedure Code, Volume II, under note (2) to Order 9 (General.)) These decisions and others making Order 9, Rule 9 applicable for setting aside an order rejecting for default an application for restoration of a suit under Order 9, 11, 9 C. P. C. overlook the position that when an appeal is preferred against an order rejecting for default an application under Rule 9 for the restoration of a suit the appeal is not against the order to set aside the dismissal or a suit within the meaning of Order 43 Rule 1 (c), that Section 141 deals with procedure alone and not with any substantive rights, and that the remedy under Order 9, Rule 9 Civil Procedure Code is not a matter of procedure but is a substantive right."