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1 - 10 of 14 (0.29 seconds)Section 19 in The Army Act, 1950 [Entire Act]
The Army Act, 1950
Section 227 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
U.O.I. & Ors vs Harjeet Singh Sandhu on 11 April, 2001
29. This reason alone is sufficient to allow the present appeal. However, we
do not propose to rest our decision on this sole reason; we take the
discussion forward as to why, independent of the aforesaid discussion,
the disciplinary action is also otherwise considered by us to be flawed.
It is solely for the reason that the decision in Harjeet Singh Sandhu
(supra) is subsequent to the appellant’s dismissal from service and we
wish to test whether, even in view of the law prevailing prior thereto,
disciplinary action which had been taken was justified on facts and in
the circumstances.
Section 197 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Sengara Singh And Ors. vs State Of Punjab And Ors. on 2 August, 1983
The answer is not far to seek. The understanding of the law
relating to discharge, as noted above, was fallacious. We unhesitatingly
hold that when a comparatively less penalty has been imposed upon an
officer with a more significant role, such disparity ought to have weighed
with the authorities while determining the punishment to be inflicted
upon the appellant. While we do not for a moment suggest that undue
leniency shown to one should also be shown to the other, and are
conscious that one mistake cannot justify another, this is a case where
the ratio of the decision of this Court in Sengara Singh v. State of
Punjab21 would seem to apply. In the absence of distinguishing
features, the appellant ought to have been treated on a par with the Wg.
Cmdr. The principle of equality would be violated when a subordinate
officer is meted out the harshest punishment for complying with a
21
(1983) 4 SCC 225
23
wrongful order of his superior, while the latter who issued it gets a
lenient treatment leading to a reprieve of sorts. It could be so that to an
extent, the appellant had exceeded in what he was required to do by the
Wg. Cmdr., yet, sight cannot be lost that the order of the Wg. Cmdr.,
which was rooted in wrongdoing, was not demonstrated to be not
binding on the appellant.