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Jijibhoy N. Surty vs T.S. Chettyer on 14 February, 1928

17. The view we have just expressed, which is based on a reading of Section 12, is also, as it seems to us, in consonance with the decided cases. Jijibhoy Surty v. T.S. Chettiar, AIR 1928 PC 103 though not concerned with appeals from a common judgment, laid down, on a construction of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, that this section was not qualified by the Civil Procedure Code or any other Act, but contained an independent direction for exclusion of time. The Privy Council there rejected a contention that because no enclosure was required by the procedural rules to be filed of copies of the judgment and decree along with a memorandum of appeal, it followed that limitation should be computed without exclusion of time taken for obtaining those copies. Dealing with that question, the Board observed:--
Bombay High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 63 - Full Document

The State Of Madras, Represented By The ... vs Mohammad Sirajudeen on 6 July, 1966

14. expressed the view that the time for preferring an appeal should be calculated on the endorsements on the copies of judgment produced in each of the appeals, even if they were filed in a batch and in one of them such copies were produced and in the rest their production was dispensed with. At the same time it was felt in that case that delay, in such cases might, however, be excused in the circumstances. The correctness of this view has been examined by us and we are of opinion that, on a proper construction of Section 12(2) and (3) and of the principles evolved by some of the decided cases relevant to the question, the view in does require modification.
Madras High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

T. Aminudeen Sahib vs Pyari Bi And Anr. on 28 January, 1920

20. In the course of the argument before us the discussion was widened to the proposition that once a certified copy of the judgment and decree furnished the basis for exclusion under Section 12(2) and (3), it would enure to the benefit of not merely the appellant who had secured them but also to other parties to the judgment appealed against, whether or not they filed appeals together or separately on the same day or different dates. Having regard to the limited scopa of the reference before us, in the light of the facts, we do not think it necessary to cover that area and express our view. It will suffice to say that Aminuddin Sahib v. Pyari Bi, ILR 43 Mad 633 - (AIR 1920 Mad 159 (2)) and Ramkishan Shastari v. Kashibai, (1907) ILR 29 All 265 do not, as we are inclined to think, contribute to such a proposition. In the first of these cases all that was held was that an appellant who was required to file with his memorandum of anneal a copy of the decree appealed from, might file a copy obtained by another party and that under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, he was entitled to a deduction of the time taken to obtain that copy. In (1907) ILR 29 All 264 it was held that the words 'the time requisite for obtaining a copy' in Section 12(2) and (3) were not confined to cases where the person appealing had in person or by a properly authorised agent applied for a copy of the judgment or decree. But that is not the question under our consideration.
Madras High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 4 - Full Document
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