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Ravi And Others vs State on 4 August, 2015 cites

Smt. Laxmi vs Om Parkash & Ors on 9 July, 2001

22. It is trite that conviction can be based solely upon a dying declaration. It is more a rule of prudence, rather than a rule of law, that the court would look for other corroborative material if the dying declaration is of steller and unimpeachable quality fully inspiring confidence. Nothing inhibits the court from relying on it and returning a finding of guilty thereupon. But for being thus applied, the dying declaration must pass the muster of it being true and voluntary and free from the vice of tutoring, prompting or imagination. It must indicate that the declarant had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant and was in a fit state to make the declaration. The court exercises caution because acceptance of such material is an exception to the rule of hearsay evidence. It is well settled that a dying declaration which is suspicious, or one suffering from infirmity, or differing in material from the prosecution version, would not be acted upon, unless other cogent evidence is available in its corroboration [Paniben v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474; Laxmi v. State, 2001 (6) SCC 118 and P. Mani v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2006 (3) SCC 16].
Supreme Court of India Cites 12 - Cited by 139 - R C Lahoti - Full Document

Smt. Paniben vs State Of Gujarat on 13 March, 1992

22. It is trite that conviction can be based solely upon a dying declaration. It is more a rule of prudence, rather than a rule of law, that the court would look for other corroborative material if the dying declaration is of steller and unimpeachable quality fully inspiring confidence. Nothing inhibits the court from relying on it and returning a finding of guilty thereupon. But for being thus applied, the dying declaration must pass the muster of it being true and voluntary and free from the vice of tutoring, prompting or imagination. It must indicate that the declarant had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant and was in a fit state to make the declaration. The court exercises caution because acceptance of such material is an exception to the rule of hearsay evidence. It is well settled that a dying declaration which is suspicious, or one suffering from infirmity, or differing in material from the prosecution version, would not be acted upon, unless other cogent evidence is available in its corroboration [Paniben v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474; Laxmi v. State, 2001 (6) SCC 118 and P. Mani v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2006 (3) SCC 16].
Supreme Court of India Cites 11 - Cited by 373 - S Mohan - Full Document
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