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Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. vs C. Santhamani, C. Rajaram, C. Sriram, C. ... on 5 December, 2002
cites
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs V.K. Chandra And Ors. on 2 May, 1990
Apart from the above decisions, learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on a decision of this Court in NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, ERODE v. BOOPATHI alias VENKATACHALAPATHY [1999 (II) M.L.J. 653] wherein one of us (P. Sathasivam, J.), after following the Division Bench decision in NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. TD., v. K. CHANDRA [1991 A.C.J. 386] held that under Section 95 (2) (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the insurance company is not liable to pay anything more than the amount limited by the Statute unless the policy contains a different provision. In that case, after referring to Ex.R-1 policy of insurance, it is held that the liability of the insurance company is restricted to Rs.1,50,000/- only. We are in agreement with the said conclusion.
Section 1 in Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 [Entire Act]
Section 11 in Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 [Entire Act]
The New India Assurance Co. Ltd vs Smt. Shanti Bai & Ors on 6 February, 1995
After considering 2,3 Judges Bench decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO., LTD. v. SHANTI BAI and AMRIT LAL SOOD v. KAUSHALYA DEVI THAPAR , Their Lordships have concluded as follows: (para 11)
"11. In the premise, we hold that the view expressed by the Bench of the three learned Judges in the case of SHANTI BAI, , is correct and answer the question set out in the order of reference in the beginning as under:
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
New India Assurance Co. Ltd vs C.M. Jaya & Ors on 17 January, 2002
In this regard, learned counsel for the appellant pressed into service a recent judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD., v. C.M. JAYA & OTHERS .
National Insurance Company Limited vs Pakkiriammal, Ponni, Priya, ... on 14 February, 2002
By pointing out the fact that in view of payment of premium of Rs.240/- towards third party risks (TPR), it is contended on the side of the claimants that the liability of the insurance company is unlimited. On the other hand, it is the case of the insurance company that, in the absence of payment of additional premium, the liability is to the extent of Rs.1,50,000/-. The Motor Insurance Rating Guide, which sets out the provisions relating to the benefits under motor insurance, has defined the types of insurance policies. Though the Motor Insurance Rating Guide has not been marked, the same was produced at the time of the argument and we have perused and considered the various clauses therein, particularly the liability to public risk policy. In our case, the policy is a third party liability insurance policy. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has also brought to our notice a Division Bench judgment of this Court (P. Shanmugam and P. Thangavel, JJ) dated 14-02-2002 made in C.M.A.No. 252/95 (National Insurance Company Ltd., Kumbakonam vs. Pakkiriammal and 5 others) wherein the Bench has considered this identical question with reference to Section 95 (1), (2) (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The Division Bench has extracted the relevant clauses from the Motor Insurance Rating Guide. After referring to various types of Insurance Policies and the liability to the Public risk, the Bench has concluded that,
"5. As per the definitions of the three types of policies, we find that each one of them are distinct and separate. The comprehensive insurance policy covers the following risks:
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Rajammal And Ors. on 8 April, 1992
8. Even at the outset, learned counsel appearing for the appellant insurance company pointed out that inasmuch as they are questioning their liability, the Cross Objection by the claimants in this appeal is not maintainable. In support of the above contention regarding maintainability of the Memorandum of Cross Objection, the insurance company relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO.LTD. v. M.R. SUBRAMANIAN & ANOTHER [1996 ACJ 1260]. In that decision, it was pointed out that since the appeal is confined to the liability of the insurance company and in that appeal the claimant cannot make a claim for enhancement, which is really directed against the owner of the vehicle who is a co-respondent in the appeal. After referring to the earlier Division Bench decision of this Court in UNITED INDIA INSURANCE COMPANY LTD., v. RAJAMMAL [1993 A.C.J 486 (Madras)], and after expressing their agreement with the decision arrived at therein, the Division Bench has held that the memorandum of cross objection is not maintainable and dismissed the same. In the light of the said contention, we have carefully considered the facts in the decision of the Division Bench referred to above and various grounds raised in this appeal. As rightly pointed out by Mr. K. Mohan Ram, learned counsel for cross objectors, though the insurance company has mainly contended their limited liability in terms of Section 92 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, a perusal of their grounds of appeal shows that they challenged the entire award of compensation, including interest, as directed by the Tribunal and after arriving the value of the appeal, paid court-fee for the entire amount. It is clear that the entire amount as awarded by the Tribunal including interest and costs are being questioned in this appeal.
Bihar Supply Syndicate vs Asiatic Navigation And ... on 17 March, 1993
In this regard, it is relevant to refer a decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. BIHAR SUPPLY SYNDICATE v. ASIATIC NAVIGATION . In the said decision, Their Lordships, after referring to Order 41 Rule 33, Civil Procedure Code, have observed thus: (para 29)
"29. Really speaking the Rule is in three parts. The first part confers on the appellate Court very wide powers to pass such orders in appeal as the case may require. The second part contemplates that this wide power will be exercised by the appellate Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection. The third part is where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, this power is directed to be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees."