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Akkadian Housing And Infrastructure ... vs Pantheon Infrastructure Private ... on 3 July, 2006
cites
Section 8 in The Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 [Entire Act]
Section 397 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Section 398 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Article 26 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
The Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996
Section 34 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Bhadresh Kantilal Shah vs Magotteaux International And Ors. on 16 December, 1999
19. I am inclined to agree with the petitioners that for various reasons indicated below the disputes raised in the petition cannot be referred to arbitration. First is the absence of commonality of the parties. Even though it was urged by Shri Sarkar that arbitration agreement covers " the affairs of the company", I find that the company is not a party to the said agreement. In Magotteaux and Limrose cases, the Board has held that if the company is not a party to the arbitration agreement, the matter covered under a petition under Sections 397/398 of the Companies Act cannot be referred to arbitration. Shri Sarkar submitted that all the respondents including the company are willing to abide by the arbitration agreement. In Sukanaya Holdings, the Supreme Court has held that the same cannot be permitted. In this connection, it is necessary to mention that while pointing out that the company is not a party to the arbitration agreement, the petitioners also pointed out that some of the other respondents are not party to the arbitration agreement. As rightly pointed out Shri Sarkar, by adding parties against whom no relief have been sought, reference to arbitration cannot be sought to be scuttled as held by this Board in Air Touch International case.
P. Anand Gajapathi Raju & Ors vs P.V.G. Raju (Died ) & Ors on 28 March, 2000
In this factual matrix and taking into consideration the provisions of Section 8 of the Act that the application under Section 8 should be filed not later than when submitting the first statement on the substance of the disputes, whether the present application can be entertained. While according to the petitioners, since the 2ndrespondent has extensively dealt with the allegations in the petition including seeking for dismissal of the petition, this reply should be considered as the first statement on the substance of the disputes, it is the contention of the 2ndrespondent that a reply to oppose grant of interim reliefs cannot be considered as the first statement on the substance of the disputes. Both the sides have referred to various case laws to substantiate their stand as indicated earlier as a part of their arguments. Shri Sarkar referred to P. Anand Gajapati Raju case 2000 4 4 SCC 688 to contend that even after reply to the main petition had been filed, the parties were referred to Arbitration. In that case, the Supreme Court considered whether during the pendency of the proceeding, parties could enter into arbitration agreement and seek for referring the disputes to arbitration. Holding that a right is created in the person bringing the action to have the disputes adjudicated by the court once the other party has submitted his first statement of defense, allowed the matter to be referred to arbitration since the other party had not objected to the same even after filing of the first statement. In the present case, the petitioners are not agreeable and as such, that case has no relevance in the present case.