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1 - 10 of 14 (0.32 seconds)Section 116 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
P. C. Purushothama Reddiar vs S. Perumal on 2 December, 1971
Similar is the view expressed by this Court in P.C.Purushothama
Reddiar vs. S.Perumal [1972 (2) SCR 646]. In this case the police reports
were admitted in evidence without any objection and the objection was
sought to be taken in appeal regarding the admissibility of the reports.
Rejecting the contention it was observed:
Brahma Nand Puri vs Neki Puri on 24 November, 1964
The High Court has, for the purpose of non-suiting the plaintiff,
placed reliance on Brahma Nand Puri Vs. Neki Pur since deceased
represented by Mathra Puri & Anr., AIR 1965 SC 1506, wherein it has
been held that in a suit for ejectment the plaintiff has to succeed or fail on
the title he establishes and if he cannot succeed on the strength of his title his
suit must fail notwithstanding that the defendant in possession has no title to
the property. The law has been correctly stated and the High Court rightly
felt bound to follow the law as laid down by this Court. However, the
question is one of applicability of the law so stated by this Court.
Addagada Raghavamma And Anr vs Addagada Chenchamma And Anr on 9 April, 1963
In a suit for recovery of possession based on title it is for the plaintiff
to prove his title and satisfy the Court that he, in law, is entitled to
dispossess the defendant from his possession over the suit property and for
the possession to be restored with him. However, as held in A.
Raghavamma & Anr. Vs. Chenchamma & Anr., AIR 1964 SC 136, there is
an essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof: burden
of proof lies upon a person who has to prove the fact and which never shifts.
Onus of proof shifts. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the
evaluation of evidence. In our opinion, in a suit for possession based on title
once the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability so as to
shift the onus on the defendant it is for the defendant to discharge his onus
and in the absence thereof the burden of proof lying on the plaintiff shall be
held to have been discharged so as to amount to proof of the plaintiff's title.
Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959
The Roman Catholic Mission vs State Of Madras And Another on 14 January, 1966
The learned counsel for the defendant-respondent has relied on The
Roman Catholic Mission Vs. The State of Madras & Anr. AIR 1966 SC
1457 in support of his submission that a document not admissible in
evidence, though brought on record, has to be excluded from consideration.
We do not have any dispute with the proposition of law so laid down in the
abovesaid case. However, the present one is a case which calls for the
correct position of law being made precise. Ordinarily an objection to the
admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not
subsequently. The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence
may be classified into two classes:- (i) an objection that the document which
is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the
objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but
is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or
insufficient. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked
as 'an exhibit', an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is
available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In
the latter case, the objection should be taken before the evidence is tendered
and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an
exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or
that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be
allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document
as an exhibit. The later proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is
whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have
enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such
mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal
because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering
the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious
about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not
prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it enables
the Court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of
admissibility then and there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the
Court on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going against the party
tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the Court
for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the
objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the
evidence. Such practice and procedure is fair to both the parties. Out of the
two types of objections, referred to hereinabove, in the later case, failure to
raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for
insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself which is sought
to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence
would be no bar to raising the objection in superior Court.