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1 - 10 of 17 (1.36 seconds)The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
The Limitation Act, 1963
The Income Tax Act, 1961
Sudarshan Cargo Pvt Ltd vs M/S Techvac Engineering Pvt Ltd on 25 June, 2013
36. As noticed above, the Arbitral Tribunal had proceeded on the
basis that an electronic communication acknowledging the debt would
sufficiently meet the parameters of Section 18 of the Limitation Act.
The Arbitral Tribunal had drawn strength from the decision of the
Karnataka High Court in Sudarshan Cargo Pvt. Ltd. v. Techvac
Engineering Pvt. Ltd. (supra). Plainly, the said view is a plausible
view and this Court is unable to accept that the said view warrants any
interference under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
Ssangyong Engineering And ... vs National Highways Authority Of ... on 8 May, 2019
In Ssangyong
Signature Not Verified
digitally signed O.M.P (COMM) 79/2021 Page 28 of 29
by:DUSHYANT
RAWAL
Engineering and Construction Company Ltd. v. National Highways
Authority of India (NHAI) (supra), the Supreme Court had
authoritatively clarified that a mere erroneous application of law
would also not warrant any interference on the ground of patent
illegality as available under Sub-section (2A) of Section 34 of the
A&C Act. Paragraph 37 of the said decision is relevant and is set out
below:
Section 4 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Section 4 in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Section 34 in The Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 [Entire Act]
P.R. Shah Shares & Stock Brokers (P)Ltd vs M/S. B.H.H. Securities (P) Ltd. & Ors on 14 October, 2011
In P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock
Brokers (P) Ltd. v. B.H.H. Securities (P) Ltd. [(2012) 1
SCC 594 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 342] , this Court held:
(SCC pp. 601-02, para 21)
"21. A court does not sit in appeal over the
award of an Arbitral Tribunal by reassessing or
reappreciating the evidence. An award can be
challenged only under the grounds mentioned in
Section 34(2) of the Act. The Arbitral Tribunal
has examined the facts and held that both the
second respondent and the appellant are liable.
The case as put forward by the first respondent
has been accepted. Even the minority view was
that the second respondent was liable as claimed
by the first respondent, but the appellant was not
liable only on the ground that the arbitrators
appointed by the Stock Exchange under Bye-law
248, in a claim against a non-member, had no
jurisdiction to decide a claim against another
member. The finding of the majority is that the
appellant did the transaction in the name of the
second respondent and is therefore, liable along
with the second respondent. Therefore, in the
absence of any ground under Section 34(2) of the
Act, it is not possible to re-examine the facts to
find out whether a different decision can be
arrived at."