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P.S. Karikalan vs The Management Of The Tamil Nadu on 2 November, 2012 cites

Colour-Chem Limited vs A.L. Alaspurkar & Ors on 5 February, 1998

Bombay Act is the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 and the Central Act is the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as laid down by definition Sections 3(1) and 3(2) of the Act. The term "victimisation" is defined neither by the Central Act nor by the Bombay Act. Therefore, the term "victimisation" has to be given general dictionary meaning. In Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th Edn., the term "victimisation", is defined at p. 1197 as follows:
Supreme Court of India Cites 18 - Cited by 144 - S B Majmudar - Full Document

Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co vs Ludh Budh Singh on 11 January, 1972

(emphasis supplied) 37 Paragraph no.62(3) of the judgment reported in (1972) 1 SCC 595, Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. vs. Ludh Budh Singh, relied on by the learned counsel for the Management is of no use to the Management. As per paragraph no.62(3) of the said judgment, once the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the enquiry was not held properly, it cannot decide the matter on merits based on the evidence adduced on merits. It is not so in this case.
Supreme Court of India Cites 17 - Cited by 338 - C A Vaidyialingam - Full Document

Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank ... vs Ram Gopal Sharma & Ors on 17 January, 2002

iii (2002) 2 SCC 244, Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. vs. Ram Gopal Sharma and Others; and "14. Where an application is made under Section 33(2)(b) proviso, the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer has to examine whether the order of dismissal or discharge is bona fide; whether it was by way of victimization or unfair labour practice; whether the conditions contained in the proviso were complied with or not etc. If the authority refuses to grant approval obviously it follows that the employee continues to be in service as if the order of discharge or dismissal never had been passed. The order of dismissal or discharge passed invoking Section 33(2)(b) dismissing or discharging an employee brings an end of relationship of the employer and employee from the date of his dismissal or discharge but that order remains incomplete and remains inchoate as it is subject to approval of the authority under the said provision. In other words, this relationship comes to an end de jure only when the authority grants approval. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. This being the position there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement. But on the other hand, if approval is given by the authority and if the employee is aggrieved by such an approval, he is entitled to make a complaint under Section 33-A challenging the order granting approval on any of the grounds available to him. Section 33-A is available only to an employee and is intended to save his time and trouble inasmuch as he can straightaway make a complaint before the very authority where the industrial dispute is already pending between the parties challenging the order of approval instead of making efforts to raise an industrial dispute, get a reference and thereafter adjudication. In this view, it is not correct to say that even though where the order of discharge or dismissal is inoperative for contravention of the mandatory conditions contained in the proviso or where the approval is refused, a workman should still make a complaint under Section 33-A and that the order of dismissal or discharge becomes invalid or void only when it is set aside under Section 33-A and that till such time he should suffer misery of unemployment in spite of the statutory protection given to him by the proviso to Section 33(2)(b). It is not correct to say that where the order of discharge or dismissal becomes inoperative because of contravention of proviso to Section 33(2)(b), Section 33-A would be meaningless and futile. The said section has a definite purpose to serve, as already stated above, enabling an employee to make a complaint, if aggrieved by the order of the approval granted."
Supreme Court of India Cites 13 - Cited by 1030 - S V Patil - Full Document
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