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1 - 10 of 11 (0.29 seconds)State Of Kerala vs A. Lakshmikutty & Ors on 10 November, 1986
11. We now come to the second question whether the petitioner was in fact practicing as an advocate at Chirala. The learned Counsel for the petitioner scruttled this issue by submitting that decision to disqualify him and to withdraw recommendation was void because of lack of opportunity given to the petitioner and hence the original recommendation should stand and the Government directed to make the appointment on the basis of that recommendation. The Supreme Court has held in State of Kerala v. A. Lakshmikutty, , that even if the Government does not make an appointment on the 'basis of the recommendation made by the High Court, the affected candidate cannot ask for a mandamus. The learned Counsel, therefore, attacked the withdrawal of the recommendation by submitting that it was made on the basis of material collected behind his back without giving him an opportunity to rebut the same. He also questioned the power of the Government to enquire into the complaint.
K.M. Sugatha Prasad And Ors. vs State Of Kerala And Ors. on 24 May, 1963
12. As far as the question of enquiring into the antecedents of the candidates are concerned, it is now well settled that the Government has a right to verify the antecedents. The Kerala High Court in the case of Sugatha Prasad v. State of Kerala, , held that a selected candidate has no right of being appointed and the nature of the materials to be collected and the satisfaction that is to be arrived at, about the character and antecedents of the person to be appointed is entirely for the appointing authority.
Dr. K. George Thomas vs The C.I.T. Kerala, Ernakulam on 23 September, 1985
The same view was taken earlier by that Court in the case of K. George v. State of Kerala, , and it was observed that the Court can interfere only if it was shown that the exclusion was based on alien or irrelevant grounds.
Chandra Mohan vs State Of Uttar Pradesh & Ors on 8 August, 1966
15. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the appointments of a District Judge is governed by the provisions of the Article 233 of the Constitution, the Government cannot act on material other than the recommendation of the High Court. He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1987 @ 1990 and in particular the following observation:
Km. Neelima Misra vs Dr. Harinder Kaur Paintal And Ors on 21 March, 1990
He also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Neelima Misra v. Harinder Kaur Paintal, and submitted that where extraneous material is relied upon, the selection will be vitiated. The learned Counsel for the respondent pointed out that the post of District Judge is not an ordinary job which can be considered as largesse but a post carrying prestige and dignity requiring great circumspection in the selection process. He also submitted that since the Government consulted the High Court, which felt that he did not qualify for the appointment, the question of giving an opportunity to the petitioner cannot arise. He submitted that the matter of natural justice depends upon the context and in the case of appointment in consultation with the High Court, such a question if arises at all is
taken care of at the time of judicial review as
a post-decisional opportunity.
S. L. Kapoor vs Jagmohan & Ors on 18 September, 1980
19. But the question still remains whether the petitioner was actually practicing at Chirala. It is with reference to this question that a doubt arose after the first recommendation because of a complaint given by somebody. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that whatever be the complaint, the petitioner is entitled to be heard before that complaint is acted upon. He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, .
Union Of India vs Shri Rati Pal Saroj & Anr on 4 February, 1998
20. The learned Counsel for the petitioner accepted that he could not have asked for an opportunity with specific reference to any verification made at that point. But, he submitted that where such a verification is made subsequent to the recommendation, he must have an opportunity to rebut the same. We can see no difference in the situation. All that has happened is that the claim he had made or that the particulars he gave in the application have been verified on the basis of certain information received subsequent to the recommendation and it was found that his claim that he was qualified was unacceptable. As long as the Government as the appointing authority or the High Court as the recommending authority, did not take into
account any irrelevant material in arriving at the conclusion that the petitioner did not fulfil the prerequisite qualifications, he cannot complain of any unfair treatment. We are fortified in this view by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Shri Rati Pal Saroj, 1998 (2) Supreme 465.
Supreme Court Advocates-On-Record ... vs Union Of India on 6 October, 1993
The present case falls under that category where the entire process including the enquiry into antecedents by the Government is only a selection process to weed out those who arc prima facie not eligible for appointment. It will be difficult and impracticable to introduce into the weeding out process, the concept of giving individual hearing with reference to any adverse material that the authorities may come across. Even in the case of appointment of the High Court Judges, the Supreme Court observed in the case of S.C. Advocates-Onrecord Association v. Union of India, as follows :
State Of Assam vs Horizon Union & Anr on 23 September, 1966
In another decision in the case of State of Assam v. Horizon Union, , where the qualification for appointment as a Presiding Officer of the Tribunal was that the person concerned must have worked as a District Judge for a period of three years, it was held that holding of that post was sufficient and he need not have actually worked as an Additional District Judge. Reading these cases it appears to us that the Supreme Court has taken note of the impracticabilities in accepting either of the extreme positions. If it is to be said that mere enrollment is enough then any briefless lawyer by lapse of time would be qualified. Not that a person who was not fortunate in getting any brief could not become an excellent Judge but that he would not have had the experience and maturity to handle the judicial work of a higher level entrusted to him. On the other hand, if it is to be held that constant and continuous practice on his own is a prerequisite, then again such persons, who will naturally be very successful in the Bar, may be reluctant to appear for a post of District Judge. In practice, therefore, it means that the candidate should be regularly attending the Court and arguing the case if not on his own but on behalf of other. We are convinced that a person cannot be qualified merely by lapse of seven years
after enrollment, if it is shown that during that period he did not actually attended the Court or could not have attended the Court by reason of his employment elsewhere.