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Sarkar Estates (Private) Ltd. vs Kusumika Iron Works (Private) Ltd. And ... on 30 November, 1960
cites
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Section 148 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Section 27 in The General Clauses Act, 1897 [Entire Act]
Indian Companies Act, 1913
Section 434 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Section 114 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Sushil Kumar Chakravarty vs Ganesh Chandra Mitra on 26 November, 1957
4. It is true that in the case before us the company has denied by its affidavit that the letter was ever received by it, but this denial by itself does not rebut the normal presumption. As pointed out by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sushil Kumar Chakravarty v. Ganesh Chandra Mitra, , unless the Court believes the fact that the registered letter was not received by the addressee or delivered to the addressee, the presumption is not rebutted. The relevant observations which were made by Das Gupta, J,, in that case are as follows:
Section 16 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Japan Cotton Trading Company Ld. vs Jajodia Cotton Mills Ld. on 24 November, 1926
Now, there can be no doubt that the Legislature while providing in Section 434(1)(a) that a letter of demand has to be delivered by registered post and not by ordinary post did so with a purpose. It is possible that as a letter of demand is a highly formal and important document to use the expression of Sir George Rankin in the case of Japan Cotton Trading Co. Ltd. v. Jajodia Cotton Mills Ltd. --and as more care is taken by the postal authorities of registered letters in the matter of their delivery to the addressee and a receipt is obtained for it, which makes its arrival at the destination more easy to prove, that the Legislature insisted on the letter of demand being sent by registered post. But can it be suggested that if the registered letter of demand is tendered to the addressee by the postal peon but the addressee refuses to accept the letter, there is no delivery of the letter within the meaning of Section 434(1)(a) of the Indian Companies Act, 1956? In my view, the answer should be in the negative. I do not think that as a matter of construction it is reasonable to limit the meaning of the expression "delivered'' to cases when the registered letter is accepted by the addressee. A tender of a registered letter which is refused by the addressee is as good a delivery as a letter which is accepted and the refusal precludes the addressee from pleading ignorance of its contents, for, otherwise, a dishonest debtor may refuse to accept a registered letter tendered by the postal peon and he may also refuse to accept the letter when it is tendered by the creditor personally or through a messenger of the creditor and thus avoid service of the statutory notice of demand and can render the provisions of Section 434(1)(a) nugatory for all practical purposes. Moreover, it is well known that a postal peon cannot leave a registered letter with the addressee without obtaining a receipt therefor. So it the company refuses to accept the letter, the postal peon or the Post Office has no other alternative but to return the letter to the sender with the endorsement of refusal and I am not prepared to hold that it is open to the company in such a case to say that because it did not accept the registered letter there was no delivery of the letter to the company. It appears to me that when a registered letter of demand, which is properly addressed, comes back with the endorsement of refusal made by the postal peon, the ordinary presumption which arises in the case of service by registered post under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Sections 114 and 16 of the Indian Evidence Act is available to the creditor and the creditor can rely
on the endorsement of refusal for proof of the fact that the letter had been duly delivered or tender-ed to the company, but it refused to accept the letter. The expression "served by post" which occurs in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act is also used in Section 434(1)(a) and the expression "causing it to be delivered at its registered office, by registered post or otherwise" has not, in my view, the effect of excluding the operation of the Ordinary presumption. Service comprehends delivery. The expression "causing it to be delivered'' has been introduced to indicate and clarify the place where delivery is to be effected, that is, at the registered office of the company.