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1 - 8 of 8 (0.28 seconds)Parshotam Lal Dhingra vs Union Of India on 1 November, 1957
This is a case apparently within the dicta of their Lordships in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case 1958 SCR 828: (AIR 1958 SC 36) and Jeewan Ram's case AIR 1958 SC 905. The order terminating the service of the appellants is, therefore, illegal and ineffective, because of non-compliance with the provisions of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. The appeal of the appellant succeeds and it is held that the order terminating the service of the appellant is illegal and ineffective, and the result is that the appellant continues in service.
Shyam Lal vs 1. The State Of Uttar Pradesh2. The Union ... on 30 March, 1954
"Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in 1953 SCR 655: (AIR 1953 SC 250). Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Art. 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1955) 1 SCR 26 : (AIR 1954 SC 369). In either of the two above-mentioned cases the termination of he service did not carry with its the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under R. 52 of the Fundamental Rules.
Shrinivas Ganesh vs Union Of India on 16 February, 1956
It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is, as Chagla C. J., has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India, 58 Bom LR 673 : (S) AIR 1956 Bom 455), wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the sight flowing from contract or the service rules, then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Art. 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Art. 311 must be complied with.
Satish Chandra Anand vs The Union Of India on 13 March, 1953
(6) The learned Single Judge dismissed the petition of the appellant on 18-8-1954, holding that the case of the appellant was covered by the rule laid down in Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India, 1953 SCR 655: (AIR 1953 SC 250), in which their Lordships held that termination of service by notice under one of the clauses of service contract is not dismissal or removal from service within Art. 311. The learned Single Judge was of the opinion that the basis of that case holds even in the case of a temporary post terminable according to the rules and the protection of Art. 311 is not attracted in such a case.
P. Balakotaiah vs The Union Of India And Others(And ... on 3 December, 1957
In other words, increment becomes due and accrues as a matter of course, but the competent authority may, for the reasons stated withhold it. In the case of the appellant the order says that the increment which fell due on 3-10-1953, was first provisionally withheld on 30-9-1953 and later on October 29, 1953 in the same order which terminated the service of the appellant, it was finally withheld with permanent effect. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that on the date of the order terminating the service of the appellant increment had become due and had accrued to the appellant and he was entitled to the increment to the date of the termination of his services from October 3, 1953. He has been deprived of the amount of the increment between October 3 and 29, 1953, thus, causing loss to him in his pay and the case of the appellant is exactly parallel to the case of AIR 1958 SC 905. The reply of the learned Deputy Advocate General is that the increment having provisionally withheld before the date on which it fell due and finally withheld with the termination of the service of the appellant, it never became due to him or accrued to him, and there has been no loss to him in his pay because he points out that in P. Balakotaiah v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 232, their Lordships have observed at paged 238, that "if the order would result in loss of benefit already earned and accrued, that would also be punishment." The position urged by the learned Deputy Advocate-General is that in this case the benefit of the increment has not been earned and has not accrued to the appellant for the reason that before it was due to the appellant it was provisionally withheld and then with the termination of the service of the appellant it was finally withheld with permanent effect. It is apparent that an increment is either withheld or it is not withheld. The effect of its provisional withholding in a case like this has really no meaning other than that the final order withholding it was suspended until the competent authority made up its mind finally. So the provisional withholding of the increment of the appellant has no effect upon the rights of the appellant to the increment. Apart from this, the order provisionally withholding the increment of the appellant was immediately connected with the charges against him and arises out of the same, it was not something independent and apart from them. In the end the irregularities which led to the termination of the service of the appellant were also the ground for withholding the increment of the appellant, thus, while terminating his service, at the same time depriving him of his pay due to him because of the increment to which he became entitled from October 3, 1953, to the date of the termination of his service. So that this is a clear case in which the misconduct of the appellant has not only operated as a motive but a foundation by depriving the appellant of his pay earned as increment between October 3 and 29, 1953, for the termination of his service, ostensibly according to the terms of his service. The termination of his service ostensibly according to the terms and conditions of his service has in the appellant's case been accompanied by a penalty or punishment causing a monetary loss to him.
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Union Of India vs Jeewan Ram on 13 March, 1958
This is a case apparently within the dicta of their Lordships in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case 1958 SCR 828: (AIR 1958 SC 36) and Jeewan Ram's case AIR 1958 SC 905. The order terminating the service of the appellants is, therefore, illegal and ineffective, because of non-compliance with the provisions of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. The appeal of the appellant succeeds and it is held that the order terminating the service of the appellant is illegal and ineffective, and the result is that the appellant continues in service.
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