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1 - 5 of 5 (0.21 seconds)The Urban Land (Ceiling And Regulation) Act, 1976
Indira Kaur And Ors. vs Sheo Lal Kapoor on 28 March, 1988
13. Reverting to the former appeal, i.e. Civil Appeal No.6620
of 2008, the High Court has affirmed the findings of facts and
the conclusion recorded by the Trial Court on material issues
against the appellant/plaintiff. In that sense, the subject
appeal questions the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the
two Courts against the appellant/plaintiff. We are conscious of
the fact that merely because two Courts have taken a
particular view on the material issues, that by itself would not
operate as a fetter on this Court to exercise jurisdiction under
Article 136 of the Constitution. This Court in the case of Smt.
Indira Kaur and Ors. Vs. Sheo Lal Kapoor,1 has observed
as follows:
M/S. Variety Emporium vs V. R. M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina on 27 November, 1984
What really
matters is whether the finding is manifestly an
unreasonable, and unjust one in the context of evidence
on record. It is no doubt true that this Court will unlock the
door opening into the area of facts only sparingly and only
when injustice is perceived to have been perpetuated. But in
any view of the matter there is no jurisdictional lock which
cannot be opened in the face of grave injustice. This view has
been taken in Variety Emporium v. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina to
which one of us (Thakkar, J.) was a party. The relevant
passage in the words of Chandrachud, C.J. may be quoted
with advantage: (SCC p. 255, para 6)
“It cannot be overlooked that three courts have held
concurrently in this case that the respondent has proved
that he requires the suit premises bona fide for his personal
need. Such concurrence undoubtedly, has relevance on the
question whether this Court should exercise its jurisdiction
under Article 136 of the Constitution to review a particular
decision. That jurisdiction has to be exercised sparingly. But,
that cannot possibly mean that injustice must be perpetuated
because it has been done three times in a case. The burden of
showing that a concurrent decision of two or more courts or
tribunals is manifestly unjust lies on the appellant. But once
that burden is discharged, it is not only the right but the duty
of this Court to remedy the injustice. Shri Tarkunde, who
appears for the respondent, argued that this may lead and,
in practice, does lead to different standards being applied by
different courts to find out whether a concurrent decision is
patently illegal or unjust. That, in the present dispensation,
is inevitable. Quantitatively, the Supreme Court has a vast
jurisdiction which extends over matters as far apart as
Excise to Elections and Constitution to Crimes. The court
sits in benches and not en banc, as the American Supreme
Court does. Indeed, even if the entire court were to sit to
hear every one of the eighty thousand matters which have
been filed this year, a certain amount of individuality in the
response to injustice cannot be avoided. It is a well known
fact of constitutional history, even in countries where the
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whole court sits to hear every case, that the composition of
majorities is not static. It changes from subject to subject
though, perhaps, not from case to case. Personal responses
to injustice are not esoteric. Indeed, they furnish refreshing
assurance of close and careful attention which the Judges
give to the cases which come before them. We do not believe
that the litigating public will prefer a computerised system of
administration of justice: only, that the Chancellor’s foot must
tread warily.”
(emphasis supplied)
Section 114 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
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