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1 - 10 of 45 (0.36 seconds)Section 79 in The Representation of the People Act, 1951 [Entire Act]
The Representation Of The People Act, 1950
Section 123 in The Representation of the People Act, 1951 [Entire Act]
Indira Nehru Gandhi vs Shri Raj Narain & Anr on 7 November, 1975
While following the ratio of Indira Nehru Gandhi's case, the Apex Court, in the cases of Subhash Desai. Chandrakanta Goyal, Ramakant Mayker and Mohan Rawale, very clearly held that the speeches relating to the period anterior to the commencement of the candidature could not be relied upon to establish corrupt practice proprio vigore. In all the aforesaid cases, the Apex Court has explicitly held that the relevant date is the date of the nomination where-from a candidate has been made responsible for a corrupt practice committed by him or his election agent or by any other person with his consent or with the consent of his election agent. The acts, omissions and speeches made by a candidate prior to his nomination has been held by the Apex Court in the aforesaid cases as irrelevant for constituting a cause of action or a corrupt practice and this is the law declared by the Apex Court and it is incorrect to say that the Apex Court laid down this law due to any concession of any of the counsel. In my considered opinion, the law declared by the Apex Court in the cases Indira Nehru Gandhi, Subhas Desai, Mohan Rawale, Chandrakanta Goyal and Ramakant Mayker are judicial precedents within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of India and is binding on this Court. The grounds on which basis Mr. Krishnamani tried to contend that the aforesaid decisions do not come within the category of judicial precedents, do not appear to be tenable nor can be taken into account to surpass the decisions of the Apex Court. So far as the submission of Mr. Krishnamani that the term "candidate" as defined in section 79(b) of the Act has a different meaning for the purposes of section 123 (3) and 123 (3A) of the Act is concerned, it has also no substance. According to section 123 (1)(A)(a) of the Act giving of bribe to any person with the object, directly or indirectly, of inducing a person to stand or not to stand as, or to withdraw or not to withdraw from being, a candidate in an election, is a corrupt practice. Mr. Krishnamani tried to submit that the expression "a person to stand or not to stand as ........a candidate at an election", occurring in section 123(1)(A)(a) of the Act clearly indicates that a person becomes a candidate even prior to his filing nomination paper. In my opinion, this submission does not appear to have any merit. Section 123 (1)(A)(a) of the Act contemplates existence of at least two persons, one who gives or offers to give the bribe, and the other, to whom the bribe is given or offered to be given. According to section 123 (1)(A), the bribe giver must be a candidate and to whom the bribe is given or offered may or may not be a candidate. The liability of corrupt practice, according to section 123 (1)(A) of the Act is on the candidate, his agent or any other person who acts with the consent of the candidate or his election agent and not on the person who is induced to stand or not to stand as a candidate, therefore, the line of reasoning submitted by Mr. Krishnamani for giving a different meaning to the term 'candidate' for the purposes of section 123 and 100 of the Act being contrary to the settled principles, has no legal support (judicial precedent). In fact what Mr. Krishnamani is trying to argue, is to restore the pre-amendment definition of the term "candidate", which after the commencement of the Amending Act, is not permissible in law specially when the Apex Court in the aforesaid decisions and in so many other decisions, propounded the date of nomination as the relevant date for the commencement of candidature of a person in an election and excluded his pre-nomination speeches etc.
Section 33 in The Representation of the People Act, 1951 [Entire Act]
Subhash Desai vs Sharad J. Rao on 31 March, 1994
22. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the principles laid down in the cases of Subhas Desai (supra), Mohan Rawale (supra), Chandrakanta Goyal (supra) and Ramakant Mayker (supra) have not laid down any law and are not binding precedents. In these cases, the principles being relied upon by the counsel for the respondent were propounded only on the concession granted by the counsels.
Section 100 in The Representation of the People Act, 1951 [Entire Act]
Section 83 in The Representation of the People Act, 1951 [Entire Act]
Azhar Hussain vs Rajiv Gandhi on 25 April, 1986
68. On the basis of the aforesaid Rule, the petitioner's counsel submitted that the petitioner had supplied the respondent the copies of all the documents which were in his possession, therefore, the documents which were not in his possession, could neither be filed nor copies thereof could be given to the respondent. The non-supplied documents have not only been referred to in the election petition but their contents have also been sufficiently pleaded in the election petition, therefore, there is no non compliance of section 81(3) of the Act. It was next submitted that the case of Azhar Hussain vs. Rajeev Gandhi (supra) is not applicable to the facts of this case. In that case there was no allegation against the returned candidate directly and it was contended that multiple third parties were working with the consent of the respondent.