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The Additional Commissioner Of Income ... vs Bhagwat Swarup Charanjit Singh on 25 February, 1981
cites
Section 22 in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Section 271 in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Addl. Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs Dongarsidas Biharilal on 20 September, 1978
(5) We find that the question: raised has been considered by a large number of High Courts and they have all taken a view contrary to the view taken by the Tribunal in the present case. The Madras High in Court K.C. Vedadri v. Commissioner of Income Tax 1973-87 Itr 76) (2), the Gujarat High Court in Additional Commissioner of Income Tax v. Santosh Industries (1974-93 Itr 567) (3), the Calcutta High Court in Sunderlal Rethi v. Income-tax Officer (1974-97 Itr 183(4) the Patna High Court in Additional Commissioner of Income Tax v. Dongarsidas Biharilal (1979116 Itr 897)(5) and in Additional Commissioner of Income Tax v. Raghunandan Prasad, Radhey Shyam (1979-116 Itr 948)(6) and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Chunnilal and Bros. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1979-119 Itr 199) have held that the imposition of a penalty under Section 271(1)(a) for the delayed submission of return under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 139 is not precluded merely because a return has been filed under Section 139(4) of the Act. It is not necessary to refer to all these decisions in detail. In our opinion it is sufficient to refer to the full bench decisions of two High Courts which have considered the matter in some detail.
Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs Gangaram Chapolia on 2 April, 1975
(6) The Orissa High Court has considered the identical issue in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Gangaram Chapolia (1976-183 Itr 613) (8). It had been argued before the full bench, inter alia, that as (the assessed had filed the return within the time allowed under Section 139(4) it should be deemed, by reason of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kulu Valley Transport Co. P. Ltd., to have filed the return within the time allowed under Section 139(1) and consequently no penalty under Section 271(1)(a) was impossible and that Section 139(4) was in the nature of a proviso to Section 139(1) for all purposes under the Act. This argument was repelled by the full bench. The full bench gave the following reasons for holding that the provisions of Section 271(1)(a) would be operative in such a case ; (1) The context and setting as well as the plain and natural meaning of the expression used in Section 271(1)(a), namely, "any person......has without reasonable cause failed to furnish the return to total income which he was required to furnish under .sub-section (1) of section 139 or by notice given under sub-section (2) of section 139 or section 148 or ......within the time allowed and in the manner inquired by sub-section (1) of section 139 or by such notice, as the case may be" excluded that time within which the return may be filed under Section 139(4) from the ambit of Section 139(1).
Metal India Products, Hathras vs The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, ... on 5 April, 1978
(7) The Allahabad High Court discussed the matter in the decision reported as Metal India Products v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1978-113 Itr 830) (9). The full bench of Allahabad High Court also pointed out that on its language clause (a) of Section 271(1) referred only to sub-sections (1) & (2) specifically but not to sub-section (4) and that if the legislature had intended that sub-section (4) should act as a proviso to sub-section (1) or (2) the legislature would have used the appropriate language. It was also pointed out that such a construction would render the second part of clause (a) of Section 271(1) totally inoperative and redundant. There was no justification for imputing to Parliament an intention to make the basis of distinction a point which renders a part of the enactment otiose. Moreover, the time limit prescribed under sub-section (4) of Section 139 has no relevance to the accrual of the default attracting penalty under Section 271(1)(a).
Income-Tax Officer vs Adarsh Construction Company ... on 18 May, 1967
The earlier decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Seth Devi Chand & Sons (1978-111 Itr 724) (10) was approved and a decision in the case of Income tax Officer v. Adarsh Construction Co., (1968-70 Itr 796)(l 1) was distinguished.
Hindustan Steel Ltd vs State Of Orissa on 4 August, 1969
On the contrary he contended, in considering a penalty provision this court should incline in favor of applying the interpretation given by the Supreme Court and not make an attempt to distinguish it. Learned counsel' also relied upon the general principles of construction (a) that in a matter of penalty some contumacious conduct on the part of the assessed should be established (vide Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa, 1972-83 Itr 26) (12), (b) that if there is a lacuna in the statute it is for the legislature to remedy it in an appropriate manner (Vide Garg & Co. v.CIT, 1974-97 Itr 639) (13) and (c) that, if a statutory provision is capable of two constructions, the one in favor of the assessed should be preferred (vide Commissioner of Income Tax v. Vegetable Products Ltd., 1973-88 Itr 192, S.C.) (14).
The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, West ... vs M/S. Vegetables Products Ltd on 29 January, 1973
(9) We have considered the contentions of the learned counsel but after devoting considerable thought to the provisions and given careful consideration to all the decisions which have been cited before us, we are of opinion that the principle laid down in the case of Kulu Valley cannot be extended to the context of Section 271(1)(a) of the Act. It is no doubt true that the Supreme Court has made observations which literally and widely construed might land support to an argument that a return filed within the time specified under Section 139(4) should be treated as a return made within the time specified or allowed under Section, 22(1). But we think that there are weighty reasons for not extending the operation of this principle to the language of Section 271 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. As pointed out by the Allahabad and Orissa High Courts the result of such a construction will be to render a part of Section 271(l)(a) completely redundant and otiose. The principle of statutory construction is well settled that no statute should be interpreted .in such a manner as to render any provision completely meaningless or redundant. It appears to us that having regard to the context of Section 271(1)(a) the reference to sub-sections (1) & (2) of Section 139 in that clause should be confined only to returns filed within the time prescribed in sub-sections (1) & (2) and cannot he extended to a return which may be filed validly but under subsection (4) of such section. We do not think that it is necessary to elaborate the point further as it is already covered by a series of decisions and the real ground of decision is within a very narrow compass as already outlined.