Peddi Reddi Jogi Reddi vs Panem Chinnabbi Reddi on 15 November, 1928
4. I agree with my learned brother that this appeal should be allowed. It seems to me that the lower Appellate Court in arriving at a conclusion of facts which cannot be assailed in second appeal has misplaced the burden of proof on the plaintiff and that consequently it is permissible to us in second appeal to examine the findings of fact as the findings of fact are not binding on us by reason of the onus having been wrongly placed on the plaintiff. That this is the true legal position has been pointed out by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Jogi Reddi v. Chinnabbi Reddi 114 Ind. Cas. 5 : 56 I.A. 6 : A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 13 : 29 L.W. 86 : (1929) M.W.N. 43 : 49 C.L.J. 98 ; Ind. Rul. (1929) P.C. 45 : 33 C.W.N. 233 : 31 Bom. L.R. 264 : 52 M. 83 : 56 M.L.J. 165 (P.C.). Their Lordships say this: "Their Lordships would further observe that all the Courts below seem to have thrown the onus upon the appellant of proving that the properties he claimed were his own, instead of placing it, as it should be, upon the plaintiff. It, therefore, appears to their Lordships that there is no question of fact to be found that can be binding upon an Appellate Court on a second appeal and that it is necessary for them to consider what is the true position." It appears in this case that the suit was brought by the plaintiff to set aside a deed of sale alleged to have been executed by her on the 2nd Falgoon 1331 B.S. on the ground that the said deed was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence. It appears that the appellant is a tenant of the defendant-respondent and her case is that she was lured into executing this document in the belief that she was really executing a deed of mortgage in consideration of certain debts which owing to the landlord both on account of arrears of rent and on account of money advanced to her. It appears and it is not disputed that the plaintiff is an illiterate village woman. She is not in the strict sense of the term 'pardanashin women' and the question arises whether the same protection which is thrown round a transaction entered into with a pardanashin woman should be extended to the plaintiff in the present case. It is true that outside the class of regular pardanashin women, it must depend in each case on the character and position of the individual woman whether those who deal with her are or are not bound to take special protections that her action should be intelligent and voluntary and to prove that it was so in case of dispute.