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1 - 10 of 16 (0.70 seconds)The Specific Relief Act, 1963
The Peerless General Finance & ... vs Swan Mills Limited & Others on 30 June, 1999
C.R. 257 and another judgment in The Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. v. Swan Mills Limited and Ors. , to contend that a development agreement cannot be enforced. All these judgments on the facts of those cases, have taken a view that a development agreement cannot be specifically enforced.
Union Construction Co. (Private Ltd.) vs Chief Engineer, Eastern Command, ... on 14 July, 1959
Reliance is also placed in the case of Union Construction Co. (Private Ltd.) v. Chief Engineer, Eastern Command, Lucknow and Anr. AIER 1960 Allahabad 72. In that case the issue was whether a building or engineering contract could be specifically performed considering Section 12(c) of the Specific Relief Act. The Court held that compensation in money would be adequate remedy.
Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd. & Anr vs The State Of Gujarat And Another on 12 September, 1974
The other contention is that, considering the agreement was stamped and stamp duty paid as a Development Agreement and it must be so held. In our opinion, mere payment of stamp duty on an instrument will not change or alter the nature of the Agreement. The Agreement will have to be read considering its terms. Reliance is placed on the Judgment in The Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. . The ratio of that judgment is that in a case of an ambiguous instrument, there is no reason why subsequent interpreting statement should be inadmissible and that extrinsic evidence to determine the effect of an instrument is permissible where there remains a doubt as to its true meaning and evidence of the acts done under it, is a guide to the intention of the parties, particularly, when acts are done shortly after the date of the instrument. In our opinion the learned Single Judge has construed the various terms of the agreement and the other material on record and at the prima facie stage has come to the conclusion that the Agreement can be specifically performed. An Appellate Court, more so a Court considering an interim order which involves exercise of discretion normally will not interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court and the exercise of discretion unless the finding is perverse. Nothing has been brought on record to hold that the findings are perverse. The document on the face of it, cannot be an agreement for security. It can only be construed as an Agreement to sell or a development agreement. In our opinion in this case, the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge was a finding eminently possible on the material on record. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the Agreement prima facie is an agreement which can be specifically enforced and consequently the Appellants have made out a prima facie case. The other predicates for grant of an injunction will be answered in the discussion that follows.
Smt. Dropadi Devi vs Ram Das And Ors. on 5 December, 1973
A similar view has been taken by another Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Smt. Dropadi Devi v. Ram Das and Ors. on a consideration of Section 3(26) of General Clauses Act. From these judgments what appears is that a benefit arising from the land is immovable property. FSI/TDR being a benefit arising from the land, consequently must be held to be immovable property and an Agreement for use of TDR consequently can be specifically enforced, unless it is established that compensation in money would be an adequate relief.