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1 - 10 of 12 (0.25 seconds)Section 25F in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
Section 25N in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
The Management Of Brooke Bond India ... vs Y.K. Gautam on 22 August, 1973
The said finding is based on the reliance placed on the judgments referred to at paragraph 10 of the impugned award upon which reliance is placed by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the company. The said findings of the learned Presiding Officer of the second respondent in holding that the petitioners were continued as probationers is contrary to law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Brooke Bond India Private Limited v Y.K. Gautam and the case referred to above, namely Wimco case and further it is also a well established principle of law that the clauses of the standing orders must be strictly interpreted and given effect to. The approach of the second respondent-Labour Court in recording the findings referred to above on the premises that there is no prohibition either in the appointment letters or in the standing orders for extension of probationary period of the petitioners is contrary to law laid down by the Apex Court. Therefore, the findings are erroneous in law. The various other judgments cited and relied upon by the learned Counsel have not been referred in this judgment for the reason that the law laid down in the above said cases are based on the relevant service rules. The law laid down in the said cases have no application to the facts of this case for the reasons assigned by this Court.
Uptron India Limited vs Shammi Bhan & Anr on 6 February, 1998
"What the clause, therefore, means is that there should have been a contract of employment for a fixed term between the employer and the workman containing a stipulation that the services could be terminated even before the expiry of the period of contract. If such contract, on the expiry of its original period, is not renewed and the services are terminated as a consequence of that period, it would not amount to "Retrenchment". Similarly, if the services are terminated even before the expiry of the period of contract but in pursuance of a stipulation contained in that contract that services could be so terminated, then in that case also, the termination would not amount to "Retrenchment".
State Of Punjab vs Dharam Singh on 2 February, 1968
This important material fact has not been taken into consideration by the second respondent-Labour Court at the time of interpreting the standing orders clause referred to above and the appointment orders and recorded a finding while answering the issue holding that these petitioners were continued on probation is contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in State of Punjab v Dharam Singh, Om Prakash Maurya v Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Sugar Factories Federation, Lucknow and Others, M.K. Agarwal v Gurgaon Gramin Bank and Others, upon which the reliance is placed by the learned Counsel, Mr. Srinivasan appearing on behalf of the petitioners. The Additional Labour Court has failed to consider the aforesaid authorities and he has also not recorded his reasons in not accepting the authorities cited supra, hence this Court in exercise of its power has to hold that the findings recorded by the Court are not only erroneous in law but also suffers from error in law, hence the said findings are liable to be quashed.
G. T. Lad & Ors vs Chemicals & Fibres Of India Ltd on 6 December, 1978
From the evidence of the management witnesses and by reading Annexures-C and D and the evidence placed on record on behalf of the workmen it is very clear that the company has refused employment to the workmen in contravention of the provisions of the Chapter V-A and V-B of the Act, referred to above and the law laid down by the Apex Court and this Court. The termination orders passed against the petitioners are otherwise for misconduct. Therefore, the termination orders in refusing employment to the workmen amount to retrenchment as defined under Section 2(oo) of the Act. Further, the management has not stated in the counter statement and produced the documentary evidence to show that the posts against which the petitioners and others who were employed were not available for the reasons stated in the counter statement that it had lost the export business on account of the USSR disintegration and that they were abolished. The company should have specifically stated before the second respondent-Additional Labour Court that such posts were abolished. Therefore, the next question that falls for consideration of this Court is whether the management has complied with the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F, clause (b) of Chapter V-A and Section 25-N of Chapter V-B of the Act, in view of the fact that the company is a factory as defined under Section 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948, therefore Chapter V-B of the Act was attracted in the instant case with regard to the retrenchment of the workmen. Admittedly, the management has not filed an application before the Karnataka State Government seeking permission to retrench 30 workmen including the petitioners. The non-compliance with the mandatory statutory provisions of Section 25-K and 25N of the Chapter V-B of Act has rendered the orders of termination void ab initio in law. Further, it is an admitted fact that either three months' notice or three months' notice pay in lieu of notice has been given to the workmen and further prior permission has not been obtained from the Government prior to refusal of employment to the workmen. Therefore, the action of the management in not complying with mandatory provisions of Section 25-N in terminating the services of the workmen is bad in law. Therefore, the termination orders passed by the management is a nullity in the eye of law. This important aspect of the matter has not been taken into consideration by the second respondent-Additional Labour Court, as he has proceeded to answer the issues and hold that the action of the management would not amount to retrenchment as it falls within the exceptional category of clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act. As I have already answered the said finding of the Additional Labour Court and held that the said finding is erroneous for the reasons recorded by me in this order holding that action of management in terminating the services of the workmen is not justified for more than one reasons assigned by me in preceding paragraphs of this order. Therefore, the Additional Labour Court's findings in the award and rejecting the claim petitions of the petitioners is an error apparent on the face of record for more than one reasons assigned by me in the preceding paragraphs of this order. Therefore, the petitioners must succeed in these petitions.
M. Kumar vs Bharath Earth Movers Limited, ... on 22 January, 1999
Therefore, reliance placed on the judgment of this Court by the learned Counsel, Smt. Shubha Ananth in the case of C.M. Jitendra Kumar v Bharat Earth Movers Limited, has no application to the facts of this case for the reasons stated above, hence the said judgment is misplaced and the same cannot be accepted. It is an undisputed fact that the petitioners were appointed against the permanent posts as machine operators by the management as per the appointment letters similar to Annexure-C. It is the case of the management that it had a set back on account of the disintegration of the USSR in the year 1991 and the evidence is adduced in this regard by examining M.W. 2 and further he has stated in his evidence that in view of the disintegration of USSR, the future of the company and its exports which was the main source of income was lost by the company, therefore the posts for which the petitioners were engaged were no longer available for their confirmation in the posts. Therefore, the company had to discontinue the petitioners who were alleged to be probationers. Some of the probationers left on their own and some were requested to leave having regard to the difficulties of the management. By reading the pleadings of the management, two things would emerge namely,
Om Prakash Maurya vs U.P. Cooperative Sugar Factories ... on 9 May, 1986
This important material fact has not been taken into consideration by the second respondent-Labour Court at the time of interpreting the standing orders clause referred to above and the appointment orders and recorded a finding while answering the issue holding that these petitioners were continued on probation is contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in State of Punjab v Dharam Singh, Om Prakash Maurya v Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Sugar Factories Federation, Lucknow and Others, M.K. Agarwal v Gurgaon Gramin Bank and Others, upon which the reliance is placed by the learned Counsel, Mr. Srinivasan appearing on behalf of the petitioners. The Additional Labour Court has failed to consider the aforesaid authorities and he has also not recorded his reasons in not accepting the authorities cited supra, hence this Court in exercise of its power has to hold that the findings recorded by the Court are not only erroneous in law but also suffers from error in law, hence the said findings are liable to be quashed.