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1 - 10 of 11 (0.32 seconds)Section 151 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Section 96 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Section 152 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Article 136 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Byram Pestonji Gariwala vs Union Bank Of India And Ors on 20 September, 1991
18. We will first consider the meaning of the words "signed by
parties". Order 3 Rule 1 of CPC provides that any appearance,
application or act in or to any Court, required or authorized by
law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except
where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time
being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his
recognized agent, or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting,
as the case may be, on his behalf. The proviso thereto makes it
clear that the Court can, if it so desires, direct that such
appearance shall be made by the party in person. Rule 4
provides that no pleader shall act for any person in any Court,
unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by
a document in writing signed by such person or by his
recognized agent or by some other person duly authorized by or
under a power-of-attorney to make such appointment. Sub-rule
(2) of Rule 4 provides that every such appointment shall be filed
in Court and shall, for the purposes of sub-rule (1), be deemed
to be in force until determined with the leave of the Court by a
writing signed by the client or the pleader, as the case may be,
and filed in Court, or until the client or the pleader dies, or until
all proceedings in the suit are ended so far as regards the client.
The question whether 'signed by parties' would include signing
by the pleader was considered by this Court in Byram Pestonji
Gariwala v. Union Bank of India [1992 (1) SCC 31] with
reference to Order 3 of CPC :
Section 3 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Jineshwardas (Dead) Through L. Rs. & Ors vs Smt. Jagrani & Anr on 26 September, 2003
In Jineshwardas (supra), such a situation was noticed. In that
case, the High Court made an order on a consensus expressed
by both the learned counsel at the time of hearing of the second
appeal, that the respondents will pay Rs.25,000/- within a period
of one month with interest in the manner stipulated. The
appellant subsequently filed an application for review,
contending that the said order disposing of the appeal was a
compromise decree, and as it was not in writing and signed by
the parties, the appeal could not have been disposed of on the
basis of the submissions. The High Court, however, refused to
entertain such objections. This Court while upholding the
decision of the High Court and holding that there was a valid
compromise, also observed :
Gurpreet Singh vs Chatur Bhuj Goel on 15 December, 1987
We have already referred to the definition of the term document.
The term instrument used in Gurpreet Singh (supra) refers to a
writing of a formal nature and nothing more. Further, we will
have to understand the observations in the context in which they
were made. In that case when the hearing of a Letters Patent
Appeal commenced before the High Court, the parties took time
to explore the possibility of a settlement. When the hearing was
resumed the appellant's father made an offer for settlement
which was endorsed by counsel for the appellant also. The
respondent who was present also made a statement accepting
the offer. Evidently, the said offer and acceptance were not
treated as final as the appeal was not disposed of by recording
those terms. On the other hand, the said 'proposals' were
recorded and the matter adjourned for payment in terms of the
offer. When the matter was taken up on the next date of
hearing, the respondent stated that he was not agreeable. The
High Court directed that the appeal will have to be heard on
merits as the respondent was not prepared to abide by the
proposed compromise. That order was challenged by the
appellant by contending that the matter was settled by a lawful
compromise by recording the statements of the appellant's
counsel and respondent's counsel, and the respondent could not
resile from such compromise and therefore, the High Court
ought to have disposed of the appeal in terms of the
compromise. It is in this factual background, that is, where there
was no consent decree, the question was considered by this
Court. The distinguishing feature in that case is that though the
submissions made were recorded, they were not signed by the
parties or their counsel. Nor did the court treat the submissions
as a compromise. In this case, the court not only recorded the
terms of settlement but thereafter directed that the statements
of the counsel be recorded. Thereafter, the statements of
counsel were recorded on oath, read over and accepted by the
counsel to be correct and then signed by both counsel. Therefore
in this case, there is a valid compromise in writing and signed by
the parties (represented counsel).
Jamilabai Abdul Kadar vs Shankerlal Gulabchand & Ors on 30 April, 1975
In this context, we may refer to the
observation made by this Court a similar situation in Smt.
Jamilabai Abdul Kadar v. Shankarlal Gulabchand [AIR 1975 SC
2202] :