Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 2 of 2 (0.31 seconds)

Mt. Akbari Begam vs Rahmat Husain And Ors. on 14 August, 1933

In support of this contention, reliance had boon placed upon certain observations made by Sulaiman C.J. in the Special Bench case in Mt. Akbari Begam v. Rahmat Husain (1933) 20 A.I.R. All. 861. The relevant passage of the judgment of the learned Chief Justice in that case runs as follows : In concurrence with the opinions of the learned bridges who have made this reference, I hold that agreement to abide by the statement of a particular witness is in substance not a reference to arbitration. The essence of arbitration is that the arbitrator decides the case and his award is in the nature of a judgment which is later on incorporated into a decree of the Court. The arbitrator can either proceed on the basis of his own knowledge or make inquiries and take evidence and then give his decision on such evidence. But, where the parties agree to abide by the statement of third person or a referee, the referee merely makes a statement according to his knowledge or belief and the Court then decides the case and pronounces its judgment on the basis of such statement and passes a decree thereon. The referee is not authorized to make inquiries and take evidence and then pronounce his decision on the basis of such evidence. He is called upon to make a statement according to his knowledge or belief. In the case of an arbitration, as the arbitrator's award is an expression of opinion and his procedure resembles that of a Court, the party is entitled to file objections and challenge the validity of his award. The making of a statement by a referee or a third person has no resemblance to a proceeding conducted by him as if he were a Court of law, and accordingly there can be no procedure for filing objections as to its validity.
Allahabad High Court Cites 38 - Cited by 25 - Full Document

Bishambhar vs Radha Kishunji on 24 February, 1931

4. Having thus rejected the application, the Court proceeded to pass a decree in terms of the statement put in by the referee. Hence the present application. The argument on behalf of the applicant is that there is nothing in the law to prevent a party who agrees to refer the dispute to a referee from resiling from that agreement and insisting on the case being decided by the Court instead of in accordance with the statement of a referee. Reliance is placed in support of this contention on two decisions of this Court, one in Tumman Singh v. sheodarshan Singh (1930) 17 A.I.R. All. 162, and the other in Bishambhar v. Radha Kishunji (1931) 18 A.I.R. all. 557. In the former case, the parties to a suit agreed to abide by the statement of a particular person who was accordingly summoned by the Court for recording his statement. But the very next day one of the parties made an application to the Court stating that he would not like to be bound by the referee's statement because he had reasons to believe that the referee was related to the other party. The Court made an inquiry into the matter and, coming to the conclusion that the allegation regarding the relationship between the referee and the other party was false, proceeded to take down the referee's statement and ultimately passed a decree in the terms of that statement. In these circumstances, it was held by a Bench of this Court that the party who had refused to be bound by the referee's statement after entering into an agreement at first that he shall be so bound could resile from that agreement before the referee made any statement in accordance with it. In the other case the parties to a suit agreed to abide by the statement of a pleader without an oath being administered to him, but before the pleader had made any statement and before any decree had been passed by the Court in accordance with that statement the plaintiff resiled from the agreement on the ground that the pleader was going to decide that there was a separation between the plaintiff and his deceased cousin effected by the mere fact that in his will he had stated that he was separate. It was again held by a Bench of this Court that it was open to the plaintiff to resile from the agreement. If the statement made by the counsel for the parties in the present case on 29th November 1937 is interpreted in the sense that Daroga Baljit Singh was appointed only as a referee and he had to make a statement upon which the Court had to decide the case, the two cases cited above would clearly govern the present case because it hi clear that the applicant had put in an objection on 13th December before Daroga Baljit Singh had made any statement in Court. The learned Small Cause Court Judge seems to be of the opinion that if the parties agree to abide by the statement of a referee, they cannot resile from that agreement even before the referee makes his statement. This position is clearly repelled by the two cases cited above.
Allahabad High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 6 - Full Document
1