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Kamal Kishore Goyal vs Union Co-Operative Insurance Society ... on 8 October, 1973 cites

Kaushalya Devi And Ors. vs Bachittar Singh And Ors. on 8 April, 1959

8. It has been argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant that order Ex 5 dated October 16, 1967, by which the appellant's service was terminated with effect from that date, was not a bonafide order because it was not permissible for the learned Single Judge in disturb that finding of the Arbitrator as it was a pure question of fact and did not suffer from any error of law apparent on the face of the record. It has been urged that while the appellant no doubt wanted to be posted as a field officer, because that was a higher post, it was not permissible for the Society to compel him to take up that post on the lesser salary which he was drawing as office assistant, and that as order Ex 4 had the effect of compelling him to accept a post which he was not bound to accept, the learned Single Judge committed an error of law in disturbing the Arbitrator's finding of fact regarding lack of bonafides on the part of the management. The learned Counsel has pointed out that the Arbitrator's finding could not be disturbed by the learned Single Judge merely because he took a different view of the evidence bearing on it Reference in this connection has been made to the decisions in Kaushalya Devi and Ors. v. Bachittar Singh and Ors. AIR 1960 SC 168, Agnani (W M.)
Supreme Court of India Cites 2 - Cited by 196 - Full Document

J.L. Mair vs The State Of Punjab And Anr. on 30 January, 1967

11. It may also be mentioned 'hat the appellant did not state the particulars or the details in support of his allegation regarding malafides That was a serious infirmity, without which it was not possible for the Arbitrator to examine and uphold the plea That the particulars and details in support of an allegation of malafides are necessary, does not require such argument because it is, for obvious reasons, impossible to examine a bald plea. This has been held to be so in J.L. Nair v. State of Punjab and Anr. , R.L. Buttail v. Union of India and Ors 1970 (II) LLJ 514, State of Haryana and Ors v. Rajindra Sareen 1972 (I) LLJ 205 It is therefore the allegations regarding malafides or lack of bonafides which can be examined when such a plea is taken, and as the particulars and details of the allegation have not been given, there was really no justification for the finding of lack of bonafides recorded by the Arbitrator.
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 5 - A N Grover - Full Document

Jagdish Mitter vs Union Of India on 20 September, 1963

13. The appellant's learned Counsel has invited our attention to paragraph 2 of the reply (Ex. 9) to the statement of claim where the Society has stated that the appellant expressed his inability to go to Bikaner unless his salary was increased, and that the Society had no alternative but to terminate his services as he was a mere probationer. It has been argued that this by itself was sufficient to establish the plea of lack of bonafides. We have already examined the relevant letters in which the question of salary was mentioned by the management, and we have given our reason for holding that they do not go to show lack of bonafides on the part of the management of the Society. It may also be mentioned that, as has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India , if, while defending the plea of his malafides, the authority concerned makes a reference to certain facts justifying the order of discharge, and those facts relate to the misconduct, negligence or inefficiency of the employee, it can not logically be said that in view of the plea thus made it should be held that the order of discharge was the result of the considerations set out in the plea. It is significant that it was not the case of the appellant that he was being compelled to go and serve outside Ajmer, in a different capacity, on the same emoluments. His case has been stated in paragraphs 6, 17 & 19 to which reference has been made already and no more. The learned Single Judge has expressly taken note of the fact that it was "not the case of the parties that the initial salary of the field officer was Rs. 200/- and, therefore, the denial of the management to give that start bad infringed the right of Shri Goyal and he was justified to refuse to join as field officer". The learned Judge has gone on to state that the appellant's learned Counsel could not place anything on the record which could enable him to judge whether the attitude of the management in taking him on the same salary on the post of field officer was wholly unjustified As has been stated the petitioner was informed by letter Ex. 4 that the question of increasing his salary would be examined after seeing his performance as a field officer, and the petitioner did not think it necessary to apply for permission to continue on the post of office assistant. There is, as we have stated, no evidence at all in support of the plea of malafide.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 216 - Full Document

Assam Oil Company vs Its Workmen on 4 April, 1960

16. It has next been argued that the order (Ex.6) by which the petitioner's service was terminated, was punitive in character, and was not an order of simple discharge of an employee by an employer, and that this Court should therefore examine the entire "chain" of letters. Reference in this connection has been made to Assam Oil Co Ltd., New Delhi v. Workmen , Free India Industries and Anr. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and Anr. 1962 (II) LLJ 602, Utkal Machinery Ltd. v. Santi Patnaik 1966 (1) LLJ 398, Girja Singh v. Director-General, Calcutta State Transport Corporation and Ors. 1966 HI) LLJ 542, Bihar State Road Transport Corporation's case 1970 (II) LLJ 138, and a judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court dated 22-8-1973 in The Management of Brooke Bond India (P) Ltd. v. Y.K.Gautam Civil Appeal No. 2490/1969. We wanted to examine the argument of the learned Counsel, but he was unable to refer us to any evidence bearing on it, beyond inviting our attention to letters Exs. 2, 3, 4 & 5 We have already examined them & have given our reasons for taking the view that they do not disclose lack of bonafides on the part of the management of the Society. We have made a reference to the contents of the letters and we are unable to find anything in them to justify the argument that the order of termination was punitive in character It has to be appreciated that the appellant was still on probation when his services were terminated by order Ex 5 dated October 16, 1967 as he did not like to carry out order Ex 4 dated October 6, 1967. It is also significant that while it has been argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the appellant's services were terminated on account of misconduct, even the Arbitrator, on whose award considerable reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel, has stated that the termination of the employment was "not due to Shri Goyal's unsatisfactory work as an Office Assistant during the probation period". There is also nothing in the evidence on the record to show that the petitioner was removed on account of misconduct. The Society has made a mention of his disinclination to go on transfer, in the reply to the statement of claim, but that was meant to rebut the appellant's claim in the industrial dispute that the order of his removal was malafide. Nothing could therefore turn on such a plea, as it was taken by way of a defence.
Supreme Court of India Cites 3 - Cited by 46 - P B Gajendragadkar - Full Document

Management Utkal Machinery Ltd vs Workmen, Miss Shanti Patnaik on 27 October, 1965

16. It has next been argued that the order (Ex.6) by which the petitioner's service was terminated, was punitive in character, and was not an order of simple discharge of an employee by an employer, and that this Court should therefore examine the entire "chain" of letters. Reference in this connection has been made to Assam Oil Co Ltd., New Delhi v. Workmen , Free India Industries and Anr. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and Anr. 1962 (II) LLJ 602, Utkal Machinery Ltd. v. Santi Patnaik 1966 (1) LLJ 398, Girja Singh v. Director-General, Calcutta State Transport Corporation and Ors. 1966 HI) LLJ 542, Bihar State Road Transport Corporation's case 1970 (II) LLJ 138, and a judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court dated 22-8-1973 in The Management of Brooke Bond India (P) Ltd. v. Y.K.Gautam Civil Appeal No. 2490/1969. We wanted to examine the argument of the learned Counsel, but he was unable to refer us to any evidence bearing on it, beyond inviting our attention to letters Exs. 2, 3, 4 & 5 We have already examined them & have given our reasons for taking the view that they do not disclose lack of bonafides on the part of the management of the Society. We have made a reference to the contents of the letters and we are unable to find anything in them to justify the argument that the order of termination was punitive in character It has to be appreciated that the appellant was still on probation when his services were terminated by order Ex 5 dated October 16, 1967 as he did not like to carry out order Ex 4 dated October 6, 1967. It is also significant that while it has been argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the appellant's services were terminated on account of misconduct, even the Arbitrator, on whose award considerable reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel, has stated that the termination of the employment was "not due to Shri Goyal's unsatisfactory work as an Office Assistant during the probation period". There is also nothing in the evidence on the record to show that the petitioner was removed on account of misconduct. The Society has made a mention of his disinclination to go on transfer, in the reply to the statement of claim, but that was meant to rebut the appellant's claim in the industrial dispute that the order of his removal was malafide. Nothing could therefore turn on such a plea, as it was taken by way of a defence.
Supreme Court of India Cites 0 - Cited by 102 - V Ramaswami - Full Document

The Management Of Brooke Bond India ... vs Y.K. Gautam on 22 August, 1973

16. It has next been argued that the order (Ex.6) by which the petitioner's service was terminated, was punitive in character, and was not an order of simple discharge of an employee by an employer, and that this Court should therefore examine the entire "chain" of letters. Reference in this connection has been made to Assam Oil Co Ltd., New Delhi v. Workmen , Free India Industries and Anr. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and Anr. 1962 (II) LLJ 602, Utkal Machinery Ltd. v. Santi Patnaik 1966 (1) LLJ 398, Girja Singh v. Director-General, Calcutta State Transport Corporation and Ors. 1966 HI) LLJ 542, Bihar State Road Transport Corporation's case 1970 (II) LLJ 138, and a judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court dated 22-8-1973 in The Management of Brooke Bond India (P) Ltd. v. Y.K.Gautam Civil Appeal No. 2490/1969. We wanted to examine the argument of the learned Counsel, but he was unable to refer us to any evidence bearing on it, beyond inviting our attention to letters Exs. 2, 3, 4 & 5 We have already examined them & have given our reasons for taking the view that they do not disclose lack of bonafides on the part of the management of the Society. We have made a reference to the contents of the letters and we are unable to find anything in them to justify the argument that the order of termination was punitive in character It has to be appreciated that the appellant was still on probation when his services were terminated by order Ex 5 dated October 16, 1967 as he did not like to carry out order Ex 4 dated October 6, 1967. It is also significant that while it has been argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the appellant's services were terminated on account of misconduct, even the Arbitrator, on whose award considerable reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel, has stated that the termination of the employment was "not due to Shri Goyal's unsatisfactory work as an Office Assistant during the probation period". There is also nothing in the evidence on the record to show that the petitioner was removed on account of misconduct. The Society has made a mention of his disinclination to go on transfer, in the reply to the statement of claim, but that was meant to rebut the appellant's claim in the industrial dispute that the order of his removal was malafide. Nothing could therefore turn on such a plea, as it was taken by way of a defence.
Supreme Court of India Cites 6 - Cited by 15 - P J Reddy - Full Document

Management Of Northern ... vs Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, ... on 27 January, 1967

It has however been further argued that is was permissible for the appellant to support the Arbitrator's conclsion or finding that the termination of his appointment was punitive, on another ground, even though it did not prevail with the Arbitrator, and our attention in this connection has been invited to Raman Bhai Asha Bhai Patel v. Dabhi Ajitkumar Fulsinji and Ors. which has been followed in B.R. Go operative Society v. Industrial, Tribunal Rajasthan and Anr. .
Supreme Court of India Cites 14 - Cited by 42 - V Bhargava - Full Document

Management Of Murgugan Mills Ltd vs Industrial Tribunal Madras And Anotmr on 11 November, 1964

Reference has also been made to Marugon Mills, Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras and Anr. 1965 (I) LLJ 422 for the further argument that if the termination of service can be shown to be in the colourable exercise of the power of the employer, or if it was the result of victimization or unfair labour practice, an industrial court would have the jurisdiction to intervene and help the workmen. The argument is however futile because when the learned Counsel was asked to refer to the other ground on which ha wanted to support his contention that the termination of the appellant's service was punitive, he actually referred to the letters which have been examined by us already. The argument is therefore quite futile. In fact the question of supporting the conclusion of the Arbitrator that the termination of the appellant's employment was punitive on another ground, does not arise because the Arbitrator has not held the termination to be punitive.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 15 - K N Wanchoo - Full Document
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