In the other case, Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Goun-
den(1), their Lordships' decision about this matter turned
on the same sort of point: see page 87.
We do not think the words admit of any doubt, particu-
larly as the words "malik mustaqil" have been used: see Ram
Gopal v. Nand Lal and Others (1) and Bishunath Prasad
Singh v. Chandika Prasad Kumari (2). But it was argued
that the award must be viewed as a whole and that certain
earlier passages show that this could not have been the
intention. ]he passages relied on are these. First, the
finding that the properties claimed by Mst. Mohan Dei as her
own really belonged to Shanker Lal. He had purchased some
and acquired others through mortgages in her name but she
was only a benamidar and had no title to them. Second, that
some of the properties in dispute were ancestral and the
rest sell acquired, though whether with the help of ances-
tral funds or not the arbitrator was unable to determine.
Third, the arbitrator's view of the Hindu law, namely that-
In our opinion, the present case is very similar to the
one which their Lordships of the Privy Council decided in
Kanhai Lal v. Brij Lal (1). There also there was a dispute
between a limited owner and a person who, but for an un-
proved claim (adoption) which he
(1) (1919) 45 I.A. 118.
See Ramgouda Annagouda v. Bhausaheb (2) where
the ground of decision was
".......but Annagouda himself being a party to and
benefiting by the transaction evidenced thereby was preclud-
ed from questioning any part of it."
It was contended, however, on the strength of Rangasami
Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden(3) and Mr. Binda Kuer v.
Lalitha Prasad(4), that even if Kishan Lal did take posses-
sion in 1889or 1890 on the strength of a title derived from
his father, that would not have precluded him from asserting
his own rights in a different character when the succession
opened
(1)(1918) 45 I.A 118.
We do not think the words admit of any doubt, particu-
larly as the words "malik mustaqil" have been used: see Ram
Gopal v. Nand Lal and Others (1) and Bishunath Prasad
Singh v. Chandika Prasad Kumari (2). But it was argued
that the award must be viewed as a whole and that certain
earlier passages show that this could not have been the
intention. ]he passages relied on are these. First, the
finding that the properties claimed by Mst. Mohan Dei as her
own really belonged to Shanker Lal. He had purchased some
and acquired others through mortgages in her name but she
was only a benamidar and had no title to them. Second, that
some of the properties in dispute were ancestral and the
rest sell acquired, though whether with the help of ances-
tral funds or not the arbitrator was unable to determine.
Third, the arbitrator's view of the Hindu law, namely that-