Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 10 of 19 (0.42 seconds)
The Central Bank Of India vs The South Indian Bank Ltd on 9 January, 2018 cites

Union Of India & Anr vs Delhi High Court Bar Association & Ors on 14 March, 2002

14. Upon examining the rival contentions, DRAT, Chennai, has rightly observed that there is no provision, enabling a person to examine his own witness, who has filed the affidavit. Though it was contended that a fraud committed by the Bank, as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Bar Association's case (cited supra), it is always open to the petitioner to prove their case, by filing necessary documents, before the Tribunal and to cross-examine the bank witness, which in the instant case, has been done.
Supreme Court of India Cites 52 - Cited by 290 - Full Document

Dadi Jagannadham vs Jammulu Ramulu & Ors on 23 August, 2001

(ii) In Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu reported in (2001) 7 SCC 71, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, 13. We have considered the submissions made by the parties. The settled principles of interpretation are that the court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. The court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The court cannot aid the legislatures defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are there.
Supreme Court of India Cites 10 - Cited by 169 - S N Variava - Full Document

Institute Of Chartered Accountants Of ... vs Ajit Kumar Iddya on 14 January, 2003

(iv) In Institute of C.A. of India v. Ajit Kumar Iddya reported in AIR 2003 Kant. 187, the Karnataka High Court held that, So far as the cardinal law of interpretation is concerned, it is settled that if the language is simple and unambiguous, it is to be read with the clear intention of the legislation. Otherwise also, any addition/subtraction of a word is not permissible. In other words, it is not proper to use a sense, which is different from what the word used ordinarily conveys. The duty of the Court is not to fill up the gap by stretching a word used. It is also settled that a provision is to be read as a whole and while interpreting, the intention and object of the legislation have to be looked upon. However, each case depends upon the facts of its own.
Karnataka High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 20 - Full Document

Indian Dental Association, By Its ... vs Union Of India (Uoi), By Its Secretary ... on 1 October, 2003

(v) In Indian Dental Association, Kerala v. Union of India reported in 2004 (1) Kant. LJ 282, the Court held that, The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, "but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used", for it is well-accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. Where the laguage of an Act is clear and explicit, the Court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature. Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. The decision in a case calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found. It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the Legislature intended something which it omitted to express. A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected.
Karnataka High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 25 - N Kumar - Full Document

D.R. Venkatachalam & Ors vs Dy. Transport Commissioner & Others on 10 December, 1976

In D.R. Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commr. [1977 (2) SCC 273] it was observed that courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation.
Supreme Court of India Cites 18 - Cited by 120 - V R Iyer - Full Document
1   2 Next