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1 - 10 of 19 (0.26 seconds)The Representation Of The People Act, 1950
The Coinage Act, 2011
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Section 99 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Laxminarayan And Another vs Returning Officer And Others on 28 September, 1973
It held that their
contents could be brought on record by direct oral evidence
in the manner prescribed by Section 160 of the Evidence Act,
a course the propriety of which has the support of decisions
in this Court in Laxminarayan and Anr v. The Returning
Officer and Ors.(1), and in Kanti Prasad Jayshankar Yagnik
v. Purshottamdas Ranchhoddas Patel and OrS.,(2). We find no
errors in the views adopted by the High Court on these
questions.
Kanti Prasad Jayshanker Yagnik vs Purshottamdas Ranchhoddas Patel And ... on 24 January, 1969
It held that their
contents could be brought on record by direct oral evidence
in the manner prescribed by Section 160 of the Evidence Act,
a course the propriety of which has the support of decisions
in this Court in Laxminarayan and Anr v. The Returning
Officer and Ors.(1), and in Kanti Prasad Jayshankar Yagnik
v. Purshottamdas Ranchhoddas Patel and OrS.,(2). We find no
errors in the views adopted by the High Court on these
questions.
Kultar Singh vs Mukhtiar Singh on 17 April, 1964
The High Court had referred to Kultar Singh v. Mukhtiar
Singh(1), and said that a candidate appealing to voters in
the name of his religion could be guilty of a corrupt
practice struck by Section 123(3) of the Act if lie accused
a rival candidate, though of the same religious
denomination, to be a renegade or a heretic. The appellant
had made a direct attack of a personal character upon the
competence of Chagla to represent Muslims because Chagla was
not, according to Bukhari, a Muslim of the kind who could
represent Muslims. Nothing could be a clearer denunciation
of a rival on the ground of religion. In our opinion, the
High Court had rightly held such accusations to be
contravention of Section 123(3) of the Act.
The second speech found to contain objectionable matter was
proved to have been delivered by the appellant on 29-2-1972
at Hussainibagh, a place said to be so situated that, though
it lies outside the Kumbharwada constituency, a meeting
there would be attended largely by persons residing within
Kumbharwada constituency. Its contents were proved by a
police Stenographer, Sheikh, who had made a full short-hand
record of it which was translated. In this speech, the
,appellant was shown to have stated that, although Muslim
personal law may be considered a personal matter by Chagla,
it was considered to be "the law of God" by Muslims who
would not tolerate any attempts to amend it as that would
raise a religious question. In the course of this speech,
the appellant is reported to have said that, if the Congress
Government brought in "amendments in our religious law", the
"battle would be fought in every street" as "the question of
religion has arisen". The appellant had threatened the
ruling Congress party with open rebellion if attempts were
made to change Muslim personal law which he called "a
question of religion". The appellant had also made
statements implying that Chagla was a supporter of this
policy of change in what Bukhari called "a matter of
religion" for Muslims. The High Court had held that these
statements amounted to a violation of Section 123(3A) of the
Act, on the ground that Bukhari's language was calculated to
promote hostility between Hindus and Muslims. It opined
that, in the appellant's mind, ,the Congress stood for the
Hindu majority. We think that the language employed, viewed
in the context of its purposes, could also fall within the
purview of Section 123(3) of the Act inasmuch as Chagla was
represented as a candidate advocating what was contrary to
Bukhari's view of Muslim religion. Indeed, the words used
by Bukhari could be said to have even graver implications.
However, we think that it was sufficiently unrestrained and
irresponsible so as to promote feelings of hostility between
different classes of citizens of India on ground of religion
and also directed personally against Chagla, an alleged
supporter of an assumed attack on Bukhari's relion. We do
not find sufficient reason to differ from the view adopted
by the High ,Court that these statements amounted to
electoral offences struck by Section 123(3A) of the Act.
The third speech containing objectionable matter was proved
to been delivered by the appellant on 2-3-1972 at Saifi
Jubilee
(1) [1964] 7 S.C.R. 790.
Hardwari Lal vs Kanwal Singh on 7 December, 1971
It was submitted that Section 80 of the Act amounts to a
prohibition against calling in question any election,
"except by an election petition presented in accordance with
the provisions of this part" (i. e. Chapter II which
contains Section 83). Apart from the fact that the High
Court dealing with this question had, in our opinion,
rightly recorded the finding that the issue No. 2, framed on
this objection, was specifically given up in its entirety by
the learned Counsel for the appellant, so that he could not
wriggle out of it by a vague reservation of some right to
286
urge that the affidavit filed was not in proper form, we
were not shown any defect of form at all in the affidavit
filed. All that was urged is that the relevant affidavit
does not give the sources of information so far as corrupt
practices. under section 123 (3) and 123 (3A) are concerned.
As was pointed out by this Court in Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal
Singh(1), this is not a defect of the required form but may,
in suitable cases, form the subject matter of an objection
based on Section 86 and Section 123 (7) of the Act relating
to supply of material particulars.