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1 - 10 of 10 (0.42 seconds)Section 32 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 160 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
In Re: Samiruddin And The Empress vs Samiruddin on 14 December, 1881
It is conceded that an oral statement of a deceased person as to the cause of his death, if made in the absence of the accused, may be proved by any one who heard it made, as well as by the person who recorded it. That is sufficient for the purpose of the case, as Ex. D has been proved by the Sub-Assistant Surgeon who heard the statement being made and signed it. With all due deference, we are unable to follow the learned Judges who decided The Empress v. Samiruddiri (1881) I.L.R. 8 C 211 and King-Emperor v. Mathura Thakur (1901) 6 C.W.N. 72, when they say that the only way of proving such a statement is by calling a person who heard it made and permitting him to refresh his memory from the writing under Section 159 of the Evidence Act. Whether they are treated as written statements of deceased persons or as written records of verbal statements, Section 32 (1) allows dying declarations which have been reduced to writing to be admitted as relevant facts. They thus become substantive evidence of the circumstances leading to the deceased person's death when the cause of the death is in question. A statement taken in the absence of the accused from a witness for the prosecution is described as a 'deposition' in Section 512, Criminal Procedure Code, but Sections 157 and 158 of the Evidence Act show that, if it satisfies the conditions of Section 32, it is nevertheless a 'statement' and as such is relevant whether the absence of the witness is caused by his death or by some other cause which makes him incapable of giving evidence in person.
Gouridas Namasudra vs Emperor on 21 November, 1908
7. The case of Gouridas Namasudra v. Emperor (1908) I.L.R. 36 C. 659 was not dissented from in this judgment because in the opinion of the Court the evidence of the Assistant Surgeon fulfilled the test laid down in that case. This case decides that anybody who has heard the deceased make a statement which has been recorded can give evidence of it either by refreshing his memory or from recollection without it. This, however, does not quite meet the point of Mr. Joseph whose contention is that P.W. 1 neither refreshed his memory nor attempted from recollection to reproduce the words used by the deceased.
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Emperor vs Balaram Das on 23 June, 1921
6. Mr. Ganapathi, the learned Acting Public Prosecutor, contends that whether the statement recorded is read over or not or whether it is signed makes no difference and that the fact that it has been read over and signed by the deponent only makes its evidentiary value stronger and with this contention we entirely agree. We are referred by Mr. Ganapathi to Emperor v. Balaram Das (1921) I.L.R. 49 C. 358 at 363 where it is stated:
Section 157 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 158 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Kunj Behari Lal vs Emperor on 3 March, 1926
4. This is relied upon by Mr. Joseph as an authority in his favour because he argues that P.W. 1 did not use the writing to refresh his memory but merely put it in without any attempt to refresh his memory or without having attempted to reproduce from his own recollection the words used by the deceased. Another case referred to by him is Kunj Lal v. Emperor (1922) 67 I.C. 577 (Lah.). The headnote of that case is as follows:
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