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1 - 10 of 10 (0.19 seconds)Section 398 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Mohanlal Ganpatram vs Shri Sayaji Jubilee Cotton And Jute ... on 18 February, 1964
8. and on what is contained in section 402(f) of the Act to hold that the company court had no power to set aside such a sale that took place in the circumstances referred to earlier. We are of the view that the factual background presented in this case is totally different from that in Sheth Mohanlal Ganpatram v. Sayaji Jubilee Cotton and Jute Mills Co. Ltd. [1964] 34 Comp Cas 777 (Guj) and we are of the view that the decision cannot have any application.
Section 290 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Section 402 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
Article 29 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Article 21 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
G. Vijayaranga Mudaliar vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras. on 5 February, 1962
Even according to exhibit P-27, the counter filed by the third respondent in C.P.No.18 of 1979, the buses were earning not less than Rs.1,000 per day on the average. RW-1, the second respondent, stated in his evidence that the daily collections in 1978 was Rs.350 per day in the case of one of the buses (Erode Town Service route) and Rs.450 per day in the case of the other bus (Erode to Vellakoil route). PW-1 in his chief-examination stated that the daily collections in one route was Rs.1,000 and in the other Rs.1,200 and there has been no effective cross-examination to whittle down the effect of his evidence. The route permits by themselves are very valuable ad the company judge had also taken note note of this and we may also point out that in G.Vijayaranga Mudaliar v. CIT [1963] 47 ITR 853, a Division Bench of this court valued, even several years back, a route permit at Rs.40,000. Further, with the ownership of the two permits, the company would have been enabled tp secure further permits, the company would have been enabled to secure further permits also. We thus find that there is absolutely no plea or acceptable evidence to show how the transfer was effected by the company to the appellant in O.S.A.No.61 of 1983. It is well-settled that if there is no plea, no amount of evidence could be looked into on a plea not put forward. It is significant that there is no plea as to how and when the third respondent became the director or managing director from 1967 to 1970 as per article 21 of the articles of association of the company or even assuming that he was originally a managing director from 1967 to 1972, as per article 29 of the articles of association of the company, how actually he became a director or managing director of the company after 1972. RW-2 claimed in the course of his evidence that he became the managing director of the company in 1972, but no documentary evidence was placed before the court show how he became the managing director in 1972 and even in the course of his oral evidence, he had not referred to the mode by which he could have legally become the managing director of the company, but that he had stated that the other director, Rasool (the second petitioner), asked him to take over the bus service as managing director, but he in turn told him that he was an illiterate and unable to run the buses, to which Rasool told him that in running the buses, he would assist him. It is further significant to note that no general meeting of the company was held after the incorporation of the company in 1967. As per section 255(2) of the Act, in the case of a private company, as the present one, the directors generally shall, in default of and subject to any regulations in the articles of the comppany, be appointed by the company in the general meeting and in the present case, the articles of the company do not say anything contra. In the face of the abovesaid admission by the third respondent that there was no general meeting of the company at all after the incorporation of the company and in the absence of evidence to shoe how the third respondent actually became the managing director of the company, at least subsequent to 1972 and prior to the alleged meeting on May 20, 1978, he could not be treated as having acted as a director or managing director of the company at all.
The Companies Act, 1956
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