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1 - 10 of 15 (0.25 seconds)Section 5 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
The Limitation Act, 1963
Article 121 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Article 120 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Mithailal Dalsangar Singh And Ors vs Annabai Devram Kini And Ors on 16 September, 2003
27. In the light of the aforesaid principles, the facts of the present case may now
be considered. The respondents herein failed to file their Application for
substitution of legal heirs under Order XXII Rule 4 of CPC, 1908 within a period
of 90 days but after a delay of 58 days. The explanation given is that they came to
know about the demise of the defendant only on 10.03.2023 when the counsel for
Signature Not Verified
C.R.P. 226/2024
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By:VIKAS ARORA
Signing Date:08.10.2024
18:05:37
the defendant filed a substitution application in the connected litigation between
the parties. From the said date, this Application has been filed within 90 days i.e.,
on 03.06.2023. Here is the case wherein there is inadvertence on the part of the
counsel who has miscalculated the period of limitation. The party who is
essentially dependent upon the counsel insofar as the legal aspects of the trial are
concerned, cannot be said to have been negligent but is a case of inadvertence. No
lack of diligence or malafide can be imputed to the party nor was the delay on
account of the conduct of the party. Though no separate Application under Order
XXII Rule 9 of CPC, 1908 has been filed for setting aside the abatement, but in the
case of Mithailal Dalsangar Singh and Ors (Supra), it has been observed that in
appropriate cases, the request for setting aside the abatement may be read into the
Application under Order XXII Rule 4 of CPC, 1908. In case, there is consideration
of condonation of delay, then too, instead of taking a pedantic approach of insisting
on an Application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of
delay, the Court is well within its power to exercise the jurisdiction of condoning
the delay, in case it is found that the delay has been sufficiently explained in the
application.
Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom Perinadu ... vs Bhargavi Amma (D) Thr. Lrs on 11 July, 2008
26. It is the sufficiency of the satisfactory explanation and not the length of
delay which is decisive for condonation of delay, as has been held in the case of
Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, (Supra).
Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs Rewa Coalfields Ltd on 4 May, 1961
In Ramlal (Supra), it has further been observed that even if sufficient cause
has been shown, a party is not entitled to condonation of delay as a matter of right.
The proof of sufficient cause is condition precedent for exercise of the
discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963. If sufficient cause is not proved, nothing further has to be done. The
application for condonation of delay has to be dismissed on this ground alone. If
sufficient cause is shown, then the Court has to inquire whether in its discretion, it
should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter introduces consideration of all
relevant facts at this stage. The diligence of the party or its bona fide may fall for
Signature Not Verified
C.R.P. 226/2024
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By:VIKAS ARORA
Signing Date:08.10.2024
18:05:37
consideration.
Balwant Singh (Dead) vs Jagdish Singh & Ors on 8 July, 2010
In the context of Order XXII Rule 9 of CPC, 1908, apex Court in Balwant
Singh (dead) vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors, (2010) 8 SCC 685 it was noted that at
times, the Courts have taken a liberal attitude, while on other occasions, a stricter
view has been preferred whenever the explanation has not been found satisfactory.
Therefore, there can be no straight-jacket formula which can be uniformly applied
to all cases without a reference to the facts and circumstances of the given case. A
word of caution was also given that the well-settled cannons of interpretative
jurisprudence provides that the Courts should not give such interpretation to the
provisions as would render them ineffective or odious. Once the provision of
Order XXII of CPC, 1908 has been enacted with particular reference to Rule 9 and
the Rules of Limitation Act, 1963 have been made applicable to entertain such
applications, these provisions must be given and true and correct meaning must be
applied whenever called for. Liberal construction of the expression 'sufficient
cause' is intended to advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no
negligence or inaction on the party of the applicant to whom want of bona fide is
imputable.