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1 - 10 of 20 (0.23 seconds)Section 12 in The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 [Entire Act]
K. Omprakash vs K. Nalini on 15 July, 1985
"13. Learned amicus submitted that waiting period
enshrined under Section 13(B)2 of the Act is directory and
can be waived by the court where proceedings are
pending, in exceptional situations. This view is supported
by judgments of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in K.
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12
Omprakash vs. K. Nalini 10, Karnataka High Court in
Roopa Reddy vs. Prabhakar Reddy11, Delhi High Court in
.
Smt. Roopa Reddy vs Prabhakar Reddy on 4 June, 1993
"13. Learned amicus submitted that waiting period
enshrined under Section 13(B)2 of the Act is directory and
can be waived by the court where proceedings are
pending, in exceptional situations. This view is supported
by judgments of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in K.
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12
Omprakash vs. K. Nalini 10, Karnataka High Court in
Roopa Reddy vs. Prabhakar Reddy11, Delhi High Court in
.
Dhanjit Vadra vs Smt. Beena Vadra on 30 January, 1990
Dinesh Kumar Gupta vs State Of Chhattisgarh 6 Wps/4027/2018 ... on 18 June, 2018
M.Krishna Preetha vs Dr.Jayan Moorkkanatt on 22 February, 2010
Contrary view has been taken by Kerala High
Court in M. Krishna Preetha vs. Dr. Jayan 10 AIR 1986 AP
167 (DB) 11 AIR 1994 Kar 12 (DB) 12 AIR 1990 Del 146 13
AIR 2005 MP 106 (DB) Moorkkanatt14. It was submitted
that Section 13B(1) relates to jurisdiction of the Court and
the petition is maintainable only if the parties are living
separately for a period of one year or more and if they
have not been able to live together and have agreed that
the marriage be dissolved. Section 13B(2) is procedural. He
submitted that the discretion to waive the period is a
guided discretion by consideration of interest of justice
where there is no chance of reconciliation and parties were
already separated for a longer period or contesting
proceedings for a period longer than the period mentioned
in Section 13B(2). Thus, the Court should consider the
r questions:
Kailash vs Nanhku & Ors on 6 April, 2005
17. In determining the question whether provision is mandatory or
directory, language alone is not always decisive. The Court has to
have the regard to the context, the subject matter and the object of the
provision. This principle, as formulated in Justice G.P. Singh's
"Principles of Statutory Interpretation" (9th Edn., 2004), has been cited
with approval in Kailash versus Nanhku and ors. as follows: 15 (2005)
4 SCC 480 "The study of numerous cases on this topic does not lead to
formulation of any universal rule except this that language alone most
often is not decisive, and regard must be had to the context, subject-
matter and object of the statutory provision in question, in determining
whether the same is mandatory or directory. In an oft-quoted passage
Lord Campbell said: 'No universal rule can be laid down as to whether
mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory
with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of courts of
justice to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully
attending to the whole scope of the statute to be considered.' " 'For
ascertaining the real intention of the legislature', points out Subbarao,
J. 'the court may consider inter alia, the nature and design of the
statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it
the one way or the other; the impact of other provisions whereby the
necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided; the
circumstances, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of
the non-compliance with the provisions; the fact that the non-
compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty; the
serious or the trivial consequences, that flow therefrom; and above all,
whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered'. If
object of the enactment will be defeated by holding the same directory,
it will be construed as mandatory, whereas if by holding it mandatory
serious general inconvenience will be created to innocent persons
without very much furthering the object of enactment, the same will be
construed as directory."