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1 - 10 of 11 (0.42 seconds)Section 15 in The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
The Hindu Succession Act, 1956
Sansir Patelin And Anr. vs Satyabati Naikani And Anr. on 19 November, 1957
With great respect. I am unable to agree with the opinion of the Orissa High Court, Sansir Patelin v. Satyabati Naikanj, AIR 1958 Orissa 75, where their Lordships have expressed their disagreement with view of Viswanatha Sastri, J. with regard to the Hindu female's right to hold in absolute state the property which is in the trespasser's possession. That obviously is to give a narrow meaning to the word "possession" unlike Viswanatha Sastri, J. who construed it as "ownership."
Natvarlal Punjabhai And Another vs Dadubhai Manubhai And Others on 18 November, 1953
7. Another anomaly which I conceive would arise is in regard to the Hindu female's power to surrender the property held by her to a reversioner. If the view is accepted that the property which the Hindu female has sold or gifted away is one in which the vendee or donee has only a limited interest to last during the lifetime of the Hindu female and that a reversioner's right to get back such property after her death has not been affected by Section 14 of the Act, it implies that the Hindu female has the power to surrender such interest. The position has now been put beyond controversy by the decision in the case of Natvarlal Punjabhai v. Dadubhai Manubhai, AIR 1954 SC 61, wherein it has been held that the widow can surrender to the reversioner even that property which she has lost by way of sale or title by adverse possession obtained by anyone.
Ram Ayodhya Missir And Ors. vs Raghunath Missir And Ors. on 8 November, 1956
Learned Counsel for the appellants, however, has contended that the decision in First Appeal No. 14 of 1950: (AIR 1958 Pat 581) (FB) is not material in so far as the present appeal is concerned and, in the next place, he has urged that the opinion expressed by this Court in the other Division Bench decisions should be held to be correct. As to the view adopted by the Division Bench in First Appeal No. 114 of 1950: (AIR 1958 Pat 581) (FB) it may be stated that Sinha J. reconsidered his own opinion expressed in a previous judgment and concluded that since the case was not argued before him in the light of the correct meaning of the word "possessed", he had followed a previous decision of this Court in the case of Ram Ayodhya Missir v. Raghunath Missir, 1956 BLJR 734: ( (S) AIR 1957 Pat 480). Having considered the matter afresh, however, he felt that the word "possessed" referred to the possession of the properly by the widow at the time the Act came into force and could not possibly refer to the case of a widow, who, though she might be alive at the date of the enforcement of the Act had already absolutely transferred the property in question by way of sale or gift before the law was enacted and before it came into force.
The Land Registration Act, 1876
B. Hanuman Prasad And Ors. vs Mst. Indrawati And Ors. on 25 September, 1957
The Allahabad High Court has held that the section is partly retrospective in so far as the past rights of the limited owners are concerned, which have been enlarged into absolute rights, and the section is prospective in so far as the rights acquired after the commencement of this Act are concerned, vide AIR 1958 All 304; Hanuman Prasad v. Mst. Indrawati.
Kally Churn Sahoo And Ors. vs The Secretary Of State For India In ... on 24 January, 1881
"As regards the northern portion of the disputed lands, other considerations apply. The Government have never had actual possession of the land through their ijaradars for a continuous period of twelve years, because the lands became submerged prior to the year 1869, and remained so (it is found by the High Court) until within ten years of the commencement of the suit. But it is urged on behalf of the Government that, having been in possession through their tenants when the lands became submerged, their possession must be deemed to have continued in law while the lands were under water and to have revived on their being re-formed, and reliance is placed on a case of Kally Churn Sahoo v. The Secy. of State. ILR 6 Cal 725, decided by the High Court in 1881. For the purpose of trying the question whether limitation applies, the Govt. must be regarded as a trespasser and dispossessor of the rightful owners, and in the opinion of their Lordships it would be contrary both to principle and authority to imply such constructive possession in favour of a wrong-doer, so as to enable him to obtain thereby a title by limitation. In order to sustain a claim to land by limitation under the Indian Act, there must in their opinion be actual possession of a person claiming as of right by himself or by persons deriving title from him."
Brijnandan Singh vs Jamuna Prasad Sahu And Anr. on 14 January, 1958
"Actual possession" is a term with an understood legal meaning and is that possession which exists where the thing is in the immediate occupancy of the party, or of his agent or tenant. The possession, therefore, of the mortgagee or of the lessee, who is a tenant, comes within the scope of the meaning of the phrase "actual possession." I need not elaborate that the possession of the licensee is the possession of the licensor as it is beyond question, I think it unnecessary further to refer to the broader sense of "possession" synonymous with "owner-ship" which I have considered . in my judgment in the case of Brijnandan Singh v. Jamuna Prasad, First Appeal No. 205 of 1948 disposed of on 14-1-1958 : (AIR 1958 Pat 589). Since, however, Viswanatha Sastri, J., himself has taken the word "possession" in a broader sense with which I agreed, I thought it unnecessary to elaborate this point further.