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1 - 10 of 25 (0.37 seconds)The Mines And Minerals (Development And Regulation) Act, 1957
T. Krishnaswamy Chetty vs C. Thangavelu Chetty And Ors. on 6 December, 1954
Some of those principles are that the applicant must have special equity in his favour and make out a strong prima facie case against the opposite party and show that he has a fair chance of success in the suit. If there is any apprehension of any danger or waste to the suit property or where the applicant makes out that the property is exposed to manifest peril, the court will feel inclined to prevent that by putting a receiver in charge of the same. A mere shadowy claim woven in the plaint with allegations which are inconsistent and apparently misleading cannot invoke the court's assistance in this respect. The cases of Bhupendra Nath v. Manohar Mukherjee, AIR 1924 Cal 456 at p. 458; P.C.L. Choudhuri v. K. Singha and H.C. Dutt, AIR 1922 Pat 318; Banwari Lal v. Moti Lal, AIR 1922 Pat 493; Kunhan Menon v. Kannan Menon, AIR 1924 Mad 482; Benoy Krishna v. Satish Chandra, 55 Ind App 131: (AIR 1928 PC 49); Alkama Bibi v. Istak Hussain, AIR 1925 Cal 970; Krishnaswamy v. Thangavelu, (S) AIR 1955 Mad 430 and Muniammal v. Ranganatha Nayagar, (S) AIR 1955 Mad 571 lay down such tests.
Firm Ram Sahay Mall Rameshwar Dayal And ... vs Bishwanath Prasad on 30 November, 1962
If the plaintiff and the defendant were the sublessees in their own right after the termination of the 1951 partnership, then either they should have contributed their lease hold interest in the suit property to the new partnership when it was formed on the 12th of June 1957 or the new partnership might have acquired the same from them after its constitution. Neither of the things has been stated in the plaint, application for receivership, show cause petition by the defendant or in his written statement filed later in the case. The partnership agreement of 1957 also does not state that. It is true that no written document or registered instrument is necessary for contributing any immoveable property or rights and interest in such property by a partner to a partnership (see Firm Ram Sahay Mall Rameshwar Dayal v. Bishwanath Prasad, AIR 1963 Pat 221). But all the same there must be evidence that such property was originally brought into stock of the firm. The pleadings, the deed of partnership of 1957 and the deed of release or the 1st of July 1961 do not make out such a case.
M.E. Moolla Sons Limited vs The Official Assignee on 26 May, 1936
When a firm is said to own a properly, it is same as saying that the partners jointly own the property. Though in the mercantile world the firm is used as a quasi corporation, for sake of convenience, it is really not so. It is different from an incorporated company, private or public. According to the definition of immoveable property in the General Clauses Act any profit arising from land is also immoveable property. An Interest in the future sale proceeds of an immoveable property was held by the Judicial Committee to be immoveable property (see M.E. Molla, Sons, Ltd v. Official Assignee, Rangoon, AIR 1936 PC 230). A partner's interest or share in the firm's assets is his proportion in the surplus that may be left, on dissolution of partnership, after payment of the firm's debts and liabilities out of the assets. In that sense his interest in the partnership may be taken to be an interest in the immoveable property belonging to the firm. Many of the cases, both English and Indian, cited by learned Counsel for the defendant undoubtedly held such interest of partners not to be immoveable property. But, if I can say so with great respect, that view is not consistent with the Indian concept of realty and ownership, or the view of the judicial Committee referred above.
The Mineral Development Ltd., Calcutta vs The Union Of India And Another on 31 August, 1960
In the case of Mineral Development Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 1373 their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that this Act was made in the public interest providing for the regulation of mines and for the development of minerals. The intention was that the mineral wealth of the country should be conserved and should be worked properly without waste and by persons qualified in that kind of work. There are two main features in connection with the working of the mines and one of them is the person who would work such mines. His capacity, financial resources and experience are to be taken into account before a mineral lease is granted to him. He is also to be possessed with a certificate of approval and income-tax clearance certificate. In order to ensure a proper check about the person who may actually control the working of any particular mine, the Mineral Concession Rules ensure that before a transfer of any mining lease is made the transferee's suitability must necessarily undergo the scrutiny of the State Government and in some case that of the Central Government; and that is why the transferor has been prohibited from making any such transfer before obtaining the consent of the Government in writing.
M.C. V. S. Arunachala Nadar Etc vs The State Of Madras & Others on 6 October, 1958
13. Learned counsel referred us to the cases of Howard v. Bodington, (1877) 2 PD 203; Macleod v. Attorney General for New South Wales, (1891) AC 455; S.S. Kalibia v. Alexander Wilson, (1910) 11 Com-WLR 689; Arunachala Nadar v. State of Madras, (1959) Supp(1) SCR 92: (AIR 1959 SC 300); Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, (1959 SCR 629): (AIR 1958 SC 731).
Mohd. Hanif Quareshi & Others vs The State Of Bihar(And Connected ... on 23 April, 1958
13. Learned counsel referred us to the cases of Howard v. Bodington, (1877) 2 PD 203; Macleod v. Attorney General for New South Wales, (1891) AC 455; S.S. Kalibia v. Alexander Wilson, (1910) 11 Com-WLR 689; Arunachala Nadar v. State of Madras, (1959) Supp(1) SCR 92: (AIR 1959 SC 300); Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, (1959 SCR 629): (AIR 1958 SC 731).
Mineral Development Ltd vs The State Of Bihar And Another on 15 December, 1959
Mineral Development v. State of Bihar, 1960 (2) SCR 609: (AIR 1960 SC 468); Catterall v. Catterall, (1847) 163 ER 1142 and Heath v. Hubbard, (1803) 102 ER 771 to buttress his argument that a restricted meaning should be adopted with reference to the restrictions imposed under Section 19 and Rule 37. The circumstances in which a restricted meaning should be attributed to a particular provision or the tests that should be applied for that purpose, as spoken in those cases are undoubtedly very apt for general guidance. But every case has to be judged on its peculiar facts. The cap has to fit the head and not the other way about Generally speaking, restrictions on fundamental rights have to be strictly construed even after they are found to be reasonable. When there is a violation within that compass, the inevitable consequence under the law must follow. In my view, Rule 37 is a reasonable restriction on one's power of disposal of property in the interest of the general public and its essential part is in regard to the previous consent of the Government.
Bishwanath Prasad vs National Coal Development Corporation ... on 23 May, 1963
From the other case, ILR 41 Pat 412 it is also manifest that even a Court has to secure previous permission of the State Government before it could put to sale any mining lease or interest therein in execution of a decree. All these lead to only one conclusion that Rule 37 is mandatory and its failure results in the nullification of the transaction. These two cases were sought by learned counsel for the defendant to be distinguished on the ground that even if the words "void and of no effect" as used in Section 19 of the Act are taken in the sense of "voidable", both the transactions involved in the two above-mentioned reported cases could have been avoided at the instance of the Government. In the latter case the Government was a party. Learned counsel contended that these two decisions do not run counter with the proposition that Section 19 should not be interpreted in the sense of absolute avoidance but only in the sense of "voidable". I am unable to accede to this contention for two reasons. If it was merely voidable then the Court should not have been compelled to obtain the previous consent of the Government before putting a mining lease into sale in execution of ft decree. The sale could have taken place and if the Government so chose might have avoided that. But to view of the peremptory character of the provision under Rule 37, this Court held in that case that no sale
could be performed without the previous consent
from the State Government. The same consideration is also seen in the latter case. It is true, as I
have already said, that a particular statutory provision has to be viewed in its proper context and
particularly with reference to the object with which
the legislature provided that. Viewed in that light,
I have no doubt in my mind that Rule 37 Is mandatory and it is a command of the statute to be
observed strictly so that the purpose of the Mines
and Minerals Act, 1957, may be effectively pursued
and preserved.