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1 - 10 of 10 (0.37 seconds)Section 24 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Shri D.K. Basu,Ashok K. Johri vs State Of West Bengal,State Of U.P on 18 December, 1996
"The decision of this Court in D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. comes
next. This decision has opened up a new vista in the
jurisprudence of the country. The old doctrine of only relegating
the aggrieved to the remedies available in civil law limits stands
extended since Anand J. (as His Lordship then was) in no
uncertain terms observed:
Indian Central Tin Works vs The Employees' State Insurance ... on 24 March, 1971
The grievance of the workman with respect to the relief refused to him is well
founded in law. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment in the case of
Hindustan Tin Works vs. Employees reported in 1979(2) SCC 80 wherein a three-
judge bench of the Apex Court held in paragraph 9 that "Ordinarily, therefore, a
workman whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to full back
wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness".
Surendra Kumar Verma Etc vs The Central Government Industrial ... on 23 September, 1980
In the case of Surendra Kumar vs. Industrial Tribunal reported in 1980(4) SCC
443 a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court discussed the reasons which may
weigh with the Court in making a departure from the normal rule of full back wages.
Thus opined Their Lordships "Plain common sense dictates that the removal of an
order terminating the services of workmen must ordinarily lead to the reinstatement
of the services of the workmen. It is as if the order has never been, and so it must
ordinarily lead to back wages too. But there may be exceptional circumstances
which make it impossible or wholly inequitable vis-à-vis the employer and workmen
to direct reinstatement with full back wages. For instance, the industry might have
closed down or might be in severe financial doldrums; the workmen concerned might
have secured better or other employment elsewhere and so on. In such situations,
there is a vestige of discretion left in the court to make appropriate consequential
orders. The court may deny the relief of reinstatement where reinstatement is
impossible because the industry has closed down. The court may deny the relief of
award of full back wages where that would place an impossible burden on the
employer. In such and other exceptional cases the court may mould the relief, but,
ordinarily the relief to be awarded must be reinstatement with full back wages. That
relief must be awarded where no special impediment in the way of awarding the
relief is clearly shown. True, occasional hardship may be caused to an employer but
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we must remember that, more often than not, comparatively far greater hardship is
certain to be caused to the workmen if the relief is denied than to the employer if the
relief is granted."
Bharat Sewa Sansthan vs U. P. Electronics Corporation Limited on 29 August, 2007
called confessional statement was obviously made by the workman in order to avoid
the capital punishment of dismissal. A confession in order to be of any assistance to
the writ petitioner should have been made a) voluntarily and b) the confession should
have been with "reference to the charge against the accused". He never confessed to
have committed the misconduct charged against him. His prayer for lesser
punishment treating his lapse a "minor misconduct" under para 19.7(I) was aimed at
securing an advantage and is therefore irrelevant under Section 24 of the Evidence
Act. In any event a confession in order to become operative needs some amount of
corroboration. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment in the case of
Bharat vs. State of U.P. reported in 1971(3) SCC 950 wherein Their Lordships held
"that a true confession made voluntarily may be acted upon with slight evidence to
corroborate it". In this case, far from any corroboration, there is even no evidence to
show that the bank suffered or was likely to suffer any loss by the alleged
misconduct of the workman. The finding of the learned Tribunal on the contrary is
that no amount is due to the bank. Mr. Mazumdar contended that no amount is due
to the bank because by dismissing the workman the bank has realised its dues which
would not have been possible otherwise. The dues of the bank were realised
admittedly from out of the money payable to the workman. Therefore the bank's
dues were fully secured. There was no scope or likelihood of the bank suffering any
loss. Moreover if the bank had not allowed the credit limit of Rs.20,000/- to be
grossly overdrawn or had the bank cancelled the credit card pursuant to the request of
the workman made by the letter dated 5th October 1996 the unpleasant situation
would not have arisen at all. The first issue is therefore answered in the negative.
Jagdish Saran & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors on 28 January, 1980
This writ petition, in the result, is dismissed and the counter claim is allowed.
The writ petitioner is directed to pay full back wages from the date of
dismissal until the date of reinstatement together with interest at the rate of 12% per
annum. Grant of interest is now a matter of procedure and ought to be granted in all
cases where there is a decree for money unless there are strong reasons to decline the
same ( See Jagdish vs. Union of India reported in 1999(3) SCC 257). The petitioner
shall also pay costs assessed at Rs.20,000/-.
Section 17B in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
M/S. P.V.K.Distillery Ltd vs Mahendra Ram on 2 March, 2009
In the case of P.V.K. Distillery Ltd. vs. Mahendra reported in 2009(5) SCC
705 Their Lordships granted only 50% of the backwages "because the appellant's
factory had been declared sick and remained closed for many years and has been
assigned to a new management led by its Chief Executive Director, Sri M.K. Polania
in order to rehabilitate/reconstruct it".
M.S. Grewal & Anr vs Deep Chand Sood & Ors on 24 August, 2001
In the case of M.S. Grewal vs. Deepchand Sood reported in 2001(8)
SCC 151 Their Lordship held that where the liability arose out of negligence the writ
court was entitled to award damages. In paragraphs 27 and 28 of the aforesaid
judgment Their Lordship held as follows:-
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