4. The senior counsel for the petitioner in addition to the arguments
already noticed above has contended that the terms of the Loan Agreement
between the parties having been reduced to writing, no other evidence can
be looked at under Sections 91 & 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and
thus the only question involved is of the interpretation of the Loan
Agreement and the RBI guidelines and Fair Practices Code aforesaid and
no disputed question of fact requiring any further evidence can be said to
be arising in the matter. Reliance is placed on ABL International Ltd. v.
Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. (2004) 3 SCC 553
laying down that in appropriate cases the writ court has jurisdiction to
entertain a writ petition involving disputed questions of fact and that where
W.P.(C) 8520/2010 Page 8 of 32
disputed questions of fact pertaining to the interpretation/meaning of
documents are involved the Courts can very well go into the same and
decide the objections if the facts so permit; it was further held that merely
because one of the parties wants to dispute the meaning of a document,
would not make it a disputed fact.
5. The senior counsel for the respondent Bank per contra has by
drawing attention to the prayer paragraph of the writ petition contended
that the writ petition seeking to restrain the respondent Bank from
downgrading the account of the petitioner or reporting the petitioner as a
defaulter, without the respondent Bank doing so is premature; it is urged
that before effecting the same, as per the prescribed rules, hearing has to be
given to the defaulter. Reliance is placed on Ulagappa v. Divisional
Commissioner, Mysore (2001) 10 SCC 639 where writ petition against a
mere proposal was held to be premature and it was held that right to sue /
challenge would accrue only on issuance of Notification including an area
within the Panchayat limits.
Similarly, with respect to Kerala State Electricity Board
(supra) it is contended that the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the High
Court judgment entertaining the writ petition.
9. The senior counsel for the petitioner in rejoinder has contended that
the respondent Bank having accepted the pre-payment tendered to it was
not entitled to thereafter debit pre-payment charges to the petitioner; it is
W.P.(C) 8520/2010 Page 13 of 32
contended that the respondent Bank ought not to have accepted the pre-
payment or ought to have returned the amount received if so not willing for
the same and having accepted the same cannot thereafter levy pre-payment
charges. It is also urged that in the Loan Agreement there is no prohibition
against pre-payment. The judgment in Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd.
(supra) is sought to be distinguished by contending that the view taken
therein was for the reason of existence of an arbitration clause and which is
not the case here.
Reliance is also placed on Binny Ltd. vs. V. Sadasivan (2005) 6 SCC 657
to contend that without an element of public law in the action taken by the
W.P.(C) 8520/2010 Page 12 of 32
Body against whom the writ jurisdiction is invoked, the remedy of judicial
review is not available.
The judgment in Sita Ram
Gupta (supra) is sought to be distinguished by reference to para 7 thereof
and contending that in that case the Court, in view of express Clause in the
agreement of the guarantee being a continuing one, held the same to be in
waiver of Section 130 of the Contract Act.
The senior counsels for the parties however
fairly stated that the question of validity of pre-payment charges had not
been agitated in any Court except before the Competition Commission in
Neeraj Malhotra (supra) aforesaid and where the same has been upheld.
The legal question though interesting is not taken up in this writ petition in
as much as the same was raised by the Court of its own initiative and since
the counsels were not given full opportunity to address thereon.
10. I had during the course of hearing raised the question of the very
validity of pre-payment charges especially in the Indian context and if not
in relation to the corporate loans as in the present case, at least in relation
W.P.(C) 8520/2010 Page 14 of 32
to personal loans. Debts/borrowing have always been recognized in India
as onerous and not merely as commercial transaction but also as moral
obligation; to remain under debt and/or to not pay the debt has always been
understood not merely as a legal/contractual default but also as moral
turpitude. Till as recently as in 2006, the law recognized the ancient
principle of pious obligation of a son to discharge debts of his father. The
question which arises is whether a person can be compelled to remain a
borrower or under a debt. The answer to me appears to be no. I find the
Three Judge Bench of Supreme Court also in N. Subramania Iyer v.
Official Receiver, Quilon AIR 1958 SC 1 to have expressed a view that an
honest borrower/debtor should be released from his multifarious
obligations at the earliest.
12. I also find two of the members of the Competition Commission in
Neeraj Malhotra to have written dissenting opinions. One of the said
dissenting members, in his dissenting opinion subsequently also in
judgment in Yashoda Hospital & Research Centre Ltd. Vs. Indiabulls
Financial Services Ltd. MANU/CO/0009/2011 relying upon various
foreign judgments, again held pre-payment charges to be invalid.