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Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Thru G.M. vs State Of U.P. Thru Secy. Labour And 3 Ors. on 1 April, 2024
cites
The Rubber Act, 1947
The Right to Information Act, 2005
Section 20 in The Rubber Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
Section 22 in The Army Act, 1950 [Entire Act]
Section 2 in The Rubber Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
Section 7 in The Rubber Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
S. Sundaram Pillai, Etc vs V.R. Pattabiraman Etc on 24 January, 1985
51. While citing the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that though the State Government was perfectly empowered to refer the dispute to a Tribunal constituted by it yet while issuing the amended reference dated 17.09.2002 it did not refer to the said proviso. However, the aforesaid argument is hyper technical inasmuch as once the State Government was exercising powers vested in it vide the notification dated 03.07.1998 consequently merely because it did not mention in the amended reference dated 17.09.2002 that it was exercising the power as vested in it under the third proviso the same cannot and will not depart from the fact that the State Government was perfectly empowered to refer the dispute to the Tribunal constituted by it, which has fairly been admitted by Sri Sinha also, and thus the judgment of S. Sundaram Pillai (supra) would have no applicability in the facts of the instant case.
Ram Sunder Ram vs Union Of India & Ors on 11 July, 2007
44. From a perusal of the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Ram Sunder Ram (supra), N.Mani (supra) & P.K.Palanisamy (supra) it clearly emerges that if an authority has a power under the law to do a particular thing but while exercising that power, the source of power is not specifically referred to that by itself would not vitiate the exercise of power so long as the power does exist and can be traced to a source available in law. At the risk of the repetition, it can be said that once the power is vested with the State Government to refer the industrial dispute to an Industrial Tribunal constituted by it considering the provisions of Section 10 (1) (d) of the Act, 1947 and the third proviso to Section 10 (1) (d) of the Act, 1947 read with notification dated 03.07.1998 then merely because in the reference order dated 13.06.2002 as amended on 17.09.2002, the third proviso to Section 10 (1) (d) of the Act, 1947 was not referred to, that by itself would not vitiate the order of reference.