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In Re: Jivandas Savchand vs Unknown on 18 July, 1930 cites

Emperor vs Ramratan Chunilal on 27 October, 1921

Putting it shortly, two rival views have been put forward, one of which has appealed to some of the High Courts and the other to other High Courts. The first view is that a loss to the principal is a normal, if not a necessary, consequence of criminal breach of trust, and that the accused can therefore be tried either where the offence was committed or the loss was incurred, and for that reliance is placed on Section 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The alternative view is that loss is not a necessary ingredient of the charge of criminal breach of trust, and that Section 179 of the Code has no application, the case falling only within Section 181, Sub-section (£). Putting it quite shortly, I think in three cases the High Court of Allahabad has taken the first of those two views, and that is the view which was taken in Emperor v. Ramratan. The second view has been taken by the High Courts of Madras, Calcutta, Lahore, Patna and Rangoon.
Bombay High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Gunananda Dhone vs Lala Santi Prakash Nandy on 25 October, 1924

The decision which appeals to me most is the judgment of Mukerji J. in Gunananda Dhone v. Lala Santi Prolcash Nanley (1924) 29 C.W.N. 432, followed in Yacoob Ahmed v. F.M. Abdul Ganny (1928) I.L.R. 6 Ran. 380. I agree entirely with the view of the learned Judge that criminal breach of trust is not an offence which counts as one of its factors the loss, which is the usual consequence of the act, and that it is the act itself which in law amounts to the offence, apart from any such consequence; and therefore the jurisdiction to try an offence of criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust is governed by Section 181, Sub-section (2), and not by Section 179. The only doubt in my mind is as regards the class of cases referred to in the concluding portion of the judgment, where by reason of the secrecy observed by the accused doubt exists as to the exact manner, point of time or place where the misappropriation and conversion, etc., takes place, all matters within the special knowledge of the accused himself, and not of the complainant, who can only judge from any overt act of the accused showing the dishonesty, which is essentially necessary to be proved. In such cases, if and where the accused is under liability to render accounts at a particular time and fails to do so, such failure may be the first overt dishonest act to the complainant's knowledge and the Court within the local limits where such failure takes places may have jurisdiction. But where the offence is completed at one place, the further liability to render accounts at another place and failure in rendering such false accounts at the second place does not confer jurisdiction under Section 179 upon the Magistrate at the latter place since the offence is already " completed at the former place. At the same time, as is conceivable, where the offence is not completed as far as the knowledge and belief of the complainant goes in the place where the money was first sent, but the dishonest intent which is a necessary ingredient is only completed not merely as evidence but actually as factum of dishonesty by some act such as the rendering of accounts, then I am unable to say that even under Section 181, Sub-section ($), the criminal Courts in the latter place are excluded from jurisdiction. In my opinion the matter entirely depends upon where the act of criminal misappropriation including the dishonest intent is completed as far as the knowledge and belief of the complainant according to the complaint go. In such a case I agree with Mukorji J. that the Courts in the place where the act is completed may have jurisdiction even though they may be different from the place where the money has been originally sent by the complainant.
Calcutta High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 18 - Full Document
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