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Rama. Muthuramalingam vs The Deputy Superintendent Of Police on 3 December, 2004 cites

Tata Cellular vs Union Of India on 26 July, 1994

In Tata Cellular vs Union of India AIR 1996 SC 11 (vide paragraph 113 ) the Supreme Court observed: (1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The Court does not sit as a court of appeal over administrative decisions but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The court does not have the expertise to correct an administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise, which itself may be fallible. In the same decision the Supreme Court observed that judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision but the decision making process ( the Wednesbury principle).
Supreme Court of India Cites 33 - Cited by 3275 - S Mohan - Full Document

Pramod Kumar Misra vs Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. And Ors. on 5 September, 2002

See also Pramod Kumar Misra vs. Indian Oil Corporation 2002 (4) AWC 3221, State of Kerala vs. Joseph Antony 1994 (1) SCC 658, etc. As Lord Denning observed: This power to overturn executive decisions must be exercised very carefully, because you have got to remember that the executive and the local authorities have their very own responsibilities and they have the right to make decisions. The courts should be very wary about interfering and only interfere in extreme cases, that is, cases where the Court is sure they have gone wrong in law or they have been utterly unreasonable. Otherwise you would get a conflict between the courts and the government and the authorities, which would be most undesirable. The courts must act very warily in this matter. ( See 'Judging the World' by Garry Sturgess and Philip Chubb). In our opinion judges must maintain judicial self-restraint while exercising the powers of judicial review of administrative or legislative decisions. In view of the complexities of modern society, wrote Justice Frankfurter, while Professor of Law at Harvard University, and the restricted scope of any man's experience, tolerance and humility in passing judgment on the worth of the experience and beliefs of others become crucial faculties in the disposition of cases. The successful exercise of such judicial power calls for rare intellectual disinterestedness and penetration, lest limitation in personal experience and imagination operate as limitations of the Constitution. These insights Mr. Justice Holmes applied in hundreds of cases and expressed in memorable language: It is a misfortune if a judge reads his conscious or unconscious sympathy with one side or the other prematurely into the law, and forgets that what seem to him to be first principles are believed by half his fellow men to be wrong.' (See Frankfurter's 'Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court'). In our opinion the administrative authorities must be given freedom to do experimentations in exercising powers, provided of course they do not transgress the legal limits or act arbitrarily.
Allahabad High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 13 - M Katju - Full Document

State Of Kerala vs Joseph Antony ( Sawant, J.) on 2 November, 1993

See also Pramod Kumar Misra vs. Indian Oil Corporation 2002 (4) AWC 3221, State of Kerala vs. Joseph Antony 1994 (1) SCC 658, etc. As Lord Denning observed: This power to overturn executive decisions must be exercised very carefully, because you have got to remember that the executive and the local authorities have their very own responsibilities and they have the right to make decisions. The courts should be very wary about interfering and only interfere in extreme cases, that is, cases where the Court is sure they have gone wrong in law or they have been utterly unreasonable. Otherwise you would get a conflict between the courts and the government and the authorities, which would be most undesirable. The courts must act very warily in this matter. ( See 'Judging the World' by Garry Sturgess and Philip Chubb). In our opinion judges must maintain judicial self-restraint while exercising the powers of judicial review of administrative or legislative decisions. In view of the complexities of modern society, wrote Justice Frankfurter, while Professor of Law at Harvard University, and the restricted scope of any man's experience, tolerance and humility in passing judgment on the worth of the experience and beliefs of others become crucial faculties in the disposition of cases. The successful exercise of such judicial power calls for rare intellectual disinterestedness and penetration, lest limitation in personal experience and imagination operate as limitations of the Constitution. These insights Mr. Justice Holmes applied in hundreds of cases and expressed in memorable language: It is a misfortune if a judge reads his conscious or unconscious sympathy with one side or the other prematurely into the law, and forgets that what seem to him to be first principles are believed by half his fellow men to be wrong.' (See Frankfurter's 'Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court'). In our opinion the administrative authorities must be given freedom to do experimentations in exercising powers, provided of course they do not transgress the legal limits or act arbitrarily.
Supreme Court of India Cites 6 - Cited by 54 - P B Sawant - Full Document

Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd vs Ajay Kumar on 27 February, 2003

The door has to be left open for trial and error. In Indian Railway Construction Co. Limited vs. Ajay Kumar (2003) 2 UPLBEC 1206 (vide para 14) the Supreme Court observed that there are three grounds on which administration action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground is illegality, the second is irrationality and the third is procedural impropriety.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 425 - A Pasayat - Full Document

Romesh Thappar vs The State Of Madras on 26 May, 1950

The expression public order was added in Article 19(2) by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, in order to meet the situation arising from the Supreme Court decision in Romesh Thappar Vs. State of Madras (AIR 1950 SC 124). After this amendment reasonable restrictions from the point of view of public order can be placed on the right to freedom of speech and expression and to assemble peaceably.
Supreme Court of India Cites 21 - Cited by 526 - S S Ali - Full Document

The Superintendent, Central ... vs Ram Manohar Lohia on 21 January, 1960

The term public order is synonymous with the public peace, safety and tranquility, vide Superintendent., Central Prison, Fategargh Vs., Ram Manohar (AIR 1960 SC 633), Madhu Limaye Vs. Sub Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr (AIR 1971 SC 2486), etc., It is thus evident that the right to freedom of speech and expression and to assemble peaceably without arms is subject to reasonable restrictions from the point of view of Public Order. The question arises, who is to determine the matter relating to Public Order? The answer is given in Entry 1 to List II (State List) of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution, which states that public order is a matter within the jurisdiction of the State. Article 162 of the Constitution states: Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of a State shall extend to the matters with respect to which the legislature of the State has power to make laws: Provided that in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a State and Parliament have power to make laws, the executive power of the State shall be subject to, and limited by, the executive power expressly conferred by this Constitution or by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof. It is thus evident that public order is a matter within the domain of the State Legislature and the State Executive. That being so, it is not proper for the Judiciary to interfere in matters relating to public order, unless there is violation of some constitutional or statutory provision. There are various considerations for the administration in this matter and the Court should not ordinarily interfere with administrative decisions in this connection. It must be remembered that certain matters are by their very nature such as had better be left to the experts in the field instead of the courts themselves seeking to substitute their own views and perceptions as to what is the best way to deal with the situation. In the present case, this Court should not interfere in a matter which relates to the administration, which is in the best position to know about the public order. What public order problem would arise if speeches are permitted or prohibited in connection with the arrest of Sankarachariyar and other incidental matters? How should the problem be tackled? It is the administration that best knows these problems and their solution. This Court should therefore exercise self-restraint and should n ot embarrass the administrative authorities in this connection. Before parting with this case we would like to briefly comment on the subject of judicial restraint while reviewing statutes or administrative decisions. We feel justified in making these comments because the times which this country is passing through requires clarification of the role of the judiciary vis-a-vis the executive and the legislature. Under our Constitution the Judiciary, the Legislature and the Executive have their own broad spheres of operation. It is important that these organs do not encroach on each others proper spheres and confine themselves to their own, otherwise there will always be danger of a reaction. Of the three organs of the State, it is only the judiciary which has the right to determine the limits of jurisdiction of all these three organs. This great power must therefore be exercised by the judiciary with the utmost humility and self - restraint. The judiciary must therefore exercise self-restraint and eschew the temptation to act as a super legislature or a Court of Appeal sitting over the decisions of the administrative authorities. By exercising self-restraint it will enhance its own respect and prestige. Of course, if a decision clearly violates some provision of the law or Constitution or is shockingly arbitrary in the Wednesbury sense, it can be struck down, but otherwise it is not for this Court to sit in appeal over the wisdom of the legislature or the executive. The Court may feel that a better decision could have been taken or some other course of action could have been adopted by the legislature or executive, but on this ground it cannot strike down the law or the administrative decision. The legislature and the executive authorities in their wisdom are free to choose different methods of solving a problem and the Court cannot say that this or that method should have been adopted.
Supreme Court of India Cites 22 - Cited by 125 - Full Document

Madhu Limaye vs Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr & ... on 28 October, 1970

The term public order is synonymous with the public peace, safety and tranquility, vide Superintendent., Central Prison, Fategargh Vs., Ram Manohar (AIR 1960 SC 633), Madhu Limaye Vs. Sub Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr (AIR 1971 SC 2486), etc., It is thus evident that the right to freedom of speech and expression and to assemble peaceably without arms is subject to reasonable restrictions from the point of view of Public Order. The question arises, who is to determine the matter relating to Public Order? The answer is given in Entry 1 to List II (State List) of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution, which states that public order is a matter within the jurisdiction of the State. Article 162 of the Constitution states: Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of a State shall extend to the matters with respect to which the legislature of the State has power to make laws: Provided that in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a State and Parliament have power to make laws, the executive power of the State shall be subject to, and limited by, the executive power expressly conferred by this Constitution or by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof. It is thus evident that public order is a matter within the domain of the State Legislature and the State Executive. That being so, it is not proper for the Judiciary to interfere in matters relating to public order, unless there is violation of some constitutional or statutory provision. There are various considerations for the administration in this matter and the Court should not ordinarily interfere with administrative decisions in this connection. It must be remembered that certain matters are by their very nature such as had better be left to the experts in the field instead of the courts themselves seeking to substitute their own views and perceptions as to what is the best way to deal with the situation. In the present case, this Court should not interfere in a matter which relates to the administration, which is in the best position to know about the public order. What public order problem would arise if speeches are permitted or prohibited in connection with the arrest of Sankarachariyar and other incidental matters? How should the problem be tackled? It is the administration that best knows these problems and their solution. This Court should therefore exercise self-restraint and should n ot embarrass the administrative authorities in this connection. Before parting with this case we would like to briefly comment on the subject of judicial restraint while reviewing statutes or administrative decisions. We feel justified in making these comments because the times which this country is passing through requires clarification of the role of the judiciary vis-a-vis the executive and the legislature. Under our Constitution the Judiciary, the Legislature and the Executive have their own broad spheres of operation. It is important that these organs do not encroach on each others proper spheres and confine themselves to their own, otherwise there will always be danger of a reaction. Of the three organs of the State, it is only the judiciary which has the right to determine the limits of jurisdiction of all these three organs. This great power must therefore be exercised by the judiciary with the utmost humility and self - restraint. The judiciary must therefore exercise self-restraint and eschew the temptation to act as a super legislature or a Court of Appeal sitting over the decisions of the administrative authorities. By exercising self-restraint it will enhance its own respect and prestige. Of course, if a decision clearly violates some provision of the law or Constitution or is shockingly arbitrary in the Wednesbury sense, it can be struck down, but otherwise it is not for this Court to sit in appeal over the wisdom of the legislature or the executive. The Court may feel that a better decision could have been taken or some other course of action could have been adopted by the legislature or executive, but on this ground it cannot strike down the law or the administrative decision. The legislature and the executive authorities in their wisdom are free to choose different methods of solving a problem and the Court cannot say that this or that method should have been adopted.
Supreme Court of India Cites 36 - Cited by 292 - M Hidayatullah - Full Document
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