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1 - 10 of 15 (0.49 seconds)Article 14 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Sunil Batra Etc vs Delhi Administration And Ors. Etc on 30 August, 1978
22. There is another catch in the proviso to the amended
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provision of Rule 19(2). This proviso while prohibiting second or third
or multiple paroles in one and the same year except in case of death of
the nearest relative allows extension of parole already granted. Sub-
clause (iii) to Clauses (A),(B) and (C) each lays down that the prisoner
shall be eligible for a maximum of 45 days of parole in a year which can
be extended upto 60 days once in 3 years only under exceptional
circumstances. Conditions governing grant of extension of parole apart,
what is important is the provision made for seeking extension upto 60
days in the same year. If a prisoner being on parole can seek extension
of the period of parole leave, one does not understand why he could not
avail of second parole in the same year if another grave contingency of
similar nature as death occurs. This is an anomaly which affects in an
unreasonable manner the basic human right of a prisoner to lead life
with dignity as recognized by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of
Navtej Singh Johar and others vs. Union of India (supra), Sunil Batra
vs. Delhi Administration (supra). The effect of this proviso is denial of
a dignified treatment to an inmate in an arbitrary and unreasonable
manner as well as giving of discriminatory treatment to an equally
situated prisoner and according to us, this is the additional reason to say
that the proviso so introduced by the notification dated 16 th April, 2018
apparently violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
Navtej Singh Johar vs Union Of India Ministry Of Law And ... on 6 September, 2018
22. There is another catch in the proviso to the amended
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provision of Rule 19(2). This proviso while prohibiting second or third
or multiple paroles in one and the same year except in case of death of
the nearest relative allows extension of parole already granted. Sub-
clause (iii) to Clauses (A),(B) and (C) each lays down that the prisoner
shall be eligible for a maximum of 45 days of parole in a year which can
be extended upto 60 days once in 3 years only under exceptional
circumstances. Conditions governing grant of extension of parole apart,
what is important is the provision made for seeking extension upto 60
days in the same year. If a prisoner being on parole can seek extension
of the period of parole leave, one does not understand why he could not
avail of second parole in the same year if another grave contingency of
similar nature as death occurs. This is an anomaly which affects in an
unreasonable manner the basic human right of a prisoner to lead life
with dignity as recognized by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of
Navtej Singh Johar and others vs. Union of India (supra), Sunil Batra
vs. Delhi Administration (supra). The effect of this proviso is denial of
a dignified treatment to an inmate in an arbitrary and unreasonable
manner as well as giving of discriminatory treatment to an equally
situated prisoner and according to us, this is the additional reason to say
that the proviso so introduced by the notification dated 16 th April, 2018
apparently violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
Section 149 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Sunil Fulchand Shah vs Union Of India And Ors on 16 February, 2000
23. Learned A.G.P. has also relied upon the case of Sunil
Fulchand Shah vs. Union of India (supra) to buttress his point that the
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action for grant of parole is generally an administrative action and,
therefore, it is beyond the challenge based upon the violations of Articles
14 and 21 and in such a case, the affected inmate can at the most
approach the State Government for redressal of his grievance. In our
humble opinion, the case of Sunil Shah does not deal with a challenge
made to an administrative action on constitutional grounds and,
therefore, in our respectful submission, this case, would render no
assistance to the learned A.P.P. to successfully demonstrate his point of
view.
Prahlad Dnyanoba Gajbhiye vs State Of Maharashtra And Another on 31 March, 1994
15. Shri M.J. Khan, learned A.P.P., further submits that the
Division Bench of this Court in the case of Pralhad Gajbhiye vs. State of
Maharashtra and another, (supra) has observed that there is a
difference between furlough and parole and held that furlough is a
matter of right, whereas, parole cannot be claimed as a matter of right.
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According to him, from this perspective, parole would have to be
considered something as a concession given by the State creating no right
in the prisoner and, therefore, the rationale of a concession unlike that of
a right cannot be legally scrutinized.
Section 449 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 59 in The Prisons Act, 1894 [Entire Act]
Gajanan Babulal Bathulwar vs The State Of Maharashtra on 7 March, 2014
16. In order to appreciate the points of arguments of both sides,
it would be necessary for us to consider the latest provision of Rule 19(2)
of the Rules 1959 and its legislative history. The amended Rule 19(2)
has been inserted by a notification issued by the Home Department of the
State of Maharashtra on 16th April, 2018. The legislative history till the
year 2012 has already been succinctly dealt with by the Division Bench of
this Court in the Case of Gajanan (supra).