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1 - 10 of 12 (0.19 seconds)Ratan Lal vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 17 December, 1970
We are aware of the caution sounded by the Supreme Court that mere nature of the act allegedly committed by the accused should not be given undue importance to determine the mental condition of the accused at the relevant point of time. Here in the present case, it is not merely the nature of the act but, as already said above, the circumstances preceding and subsequent to the incident of offence do warrant a conclusion that the appellant has sufficiently discharged the burden of proof cast upon him by law to prove that he was falling within the four corners of the ambit of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code. The presumption of sanity stands rebutted by the facts which have come on record. The case of the present appellant thus clearly falls within the principle propounded and laid down by the decision of the Supreme Court in Ratan Lal v. State of M.P., .
Section 332 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 353 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 105 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Ahmadulla on 25 January, 1961
The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor relied upon, in this context, the classic ruling in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ahmadulla, which laid down that the burden of proof that the mental condition of the accused was, at the crucial point of time, such as is described by S. 84 of the Indian Penal Code lay on the accused who claimed the benefit of that exemption. In that case, the defence had led evidence of a District Civil Surgeon and Superintendent of the Mental Hospital both of whom had given evidence about the nature of epileptic insanity. On facts, it was held that the evidence could not prove the mental condition of the appellant at the time of the act. It must be pertinently noted that it was not a plea in that case on behalf of the defence that the appellant was not in a position to prove because of his insanity, that at the relevant point of time he was insane.
Labour Law Practitioner'S Association ... vs State Of Maharashtra And Ors. on 12 June, 1979
11. The next ruling relied upon by the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor was in S. W. Mohammed v. State of Maharashtra, in which it was observed that the law presumed every person of the age of discretion to be sane unless the contrary was proved. A caution note was sounded that it would be most dangerous to admit the defence of insanity upon arguments derived merely from the character of the crime and that the mere fact that no motive has been proved for the offence in question or that he had made no attempt to run away, though it was possible for him to do so, would not indicate that he was insane. Laying down the similar proposition as laid down in the former ruling, the conviction of the appellant before the Supreme Court was confirmed by that Court after finding on facts, that the appellant had failed to prove the required state of mind at the time of the commission of the offence. In this case also, it was not the plea of the defence that the appellant was unable to prove his defence of insanity on account of his insanity.
Oyami Ayatu vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 20 August, 1973
In Oyami Ayatu v. State of M.P., , the Supreme Court had again referred to the presumption in favour of sanity of the person of discretion and the awareness of the natural consequences of his act. It was pointed out the presumption was rebuttable and that the accused could rebut it by placing before the Court all the relevant evidence. It was also pointed out that the burden, in such cases, though not as heavy as upon the prosecution in a criminal case, is upon the accused to prove that he was of unsound mind at the time of the commission of the offence and as such, incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law. In this case, the Supreme Court had noted (in para 5 of the AIR report) that no plea was taken on behalf of the appellant at the trial that he was not a sane person. Much less was there a plea on behalf of the defence in the trial Court that the accused before the Court was not in a position to prove, on account of his insanity, his insanity at the relevant point of time.