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Sangramsingh vs Election Tribunal, Kotah on 17 July, 1953

21. In light of the decisions cited above, it is clear that even if the word "shall" is used in the Code it need not be construed that the time limit prescribed in Order 8, Rule 1 of the Code is mandatory. Before proceeding further it would be necessary to bear in mind the observations of Bose J., in Sangramsingh v. Election Tribunal Kotah and Anr. (supra) that, "Code of Procedure.... is "procedure" something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties, not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. Our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exception and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle".
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 4 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd vs Municlpal Board, Rampur on 30 October, 1964

In Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board, , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had to consider the question whether Section 135(3) read with Section 94(3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act was mandatory or directory. The facts were that Rampur Municipality, by a special resolution, proposed to levy property tax on persons or a class of persons. Section 131(3) required that the Board shall pass a resolution and have it published in the manner prescribed in section 94 of such proposed tax. Section 135(3) declared that a notification of the imposition of the tax under sub-section (2) thereof shall be conclusive proof that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Under Section 94(3), every resolution passed by the Board shall be published in a local Hindi newspaper or in its absence by general or special order as may be directed by the State Government. The Municipality had contended that it had followed that procedure. The appellants contended that there was infraction in that behalf. While considering that question, per majority it was held that:
Supreme Court of India Cites 33 - Cited by 230 - K N Wanchoo - Full Document

Topline Shoes Ltd vs Corporation Bank on 8 July, 2002

In recent decision in Topline Shoes Ltd. v. Corporation Bank, , the Supreme Court, while dealing with the interpretation of the provisions of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 formulated following question for determination -- whether or not the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, could grant time to the respondent to file his reply, beyond a total period of 45 days, in view of Section 13(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The Supreme Court after considering the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the said Act held thus:
Supreme Court of India Cites 12 - Cited by 405 - B Kumar - Full Document
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