Vidya Varuthi Thirtha vs Balusami Ayyar on 5 July, 1921
3. The question arises on the construction of the Privy Council case in Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal v. Balusami Ayyar A. I. R. 1922 P. C. 123 where it was held that Art. 134, Lim. Act, does not apply to a permanent lease granted by the head of a mutt. Their Lordships point out that the lease in question could only enure for the lifetime of the grantor who is referred to as Mahant 1. With regard to Mahant 2, he had a similar power, i. e., the granting of leases to last for his lifetime. Instead of granting a fresh lease for that period he allowed the plaintiff to continue the possession which he had acquired from Mahant 1, and continued to receive rents. It was held that this could only be referable to a new tenancy created by him and, therefore, the possession of the alienee did not become adverse until the death of Mahant 2. The District Judge had applied the decision to this case; and the question is: Is he right? It is alleged for the appellant that this is not a case of lease; there is no acceptance of rent; there is no presumption of permission and if the principle laid down by' the Privy Council is adopted in cases of the sort under consideration, all pleas of adverse possession will fall to the ground. I do not agree. There is no doubt that special considerations have been held to apply to the property of temples and the reason why such considerations have been applied is well pointed out by Devadoss. J., in a judgment to which I shall refer shortly. It is not true to say that adverse possession will never lie in such cases; for if the successor-in-office of the alienor of temple property sits by for 12 years after the death of his predecessor, there is no doubt that in the absence of special circumstances he will be unable to recover the property of the temple.