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1 - 10 of 16 (0.29 seconds)Article 14 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
State Of Maharashtra Etc. Etc vs Mrs. Kamal Sukumar Durgule And Ors. Etc on 28 November, 1984
25. Mrs. Kamal Sukumar Durgule (supra) was a case in which initially the Act was unconstitutional and thereafter certain rules were framed a few years after removing the infirmities from which the Act was suffering. In that context, it was observed that if the Act was initially unconstitutional then its invalidity cannot be cured by framing rules few years after removing the infirmities. But that is not the case here.
Dr. Dinesh Kumar & Ors vs Motilal Nehru Medical College ... on 1 May, 1985
In Dinesh Kumar's case, the question was of admission to the professional college for medical education like M.B.B.S. and Post Graduate Courses. But here we are concerned with the teachers who are to be employed at the grass root level and a due regard has to be given to the rural set up social structure of the villages and to provided more and more job opportunities to people living in villages so as to avoid pressure on urban areas. There are the essential factors which have to be taken into consideration and we should not lose sight of the social milieu of our country side. Therefore, we are of the opinion that keeping in view that back-ground this circular issued by the State Government cannot be frowned upon. Thus, we are of the view that the criteria is a valid criteria which reflects the need of the situation and minimise the arbitrariness and leaves a little room for bungling. In fact, this was a better way for bringing uniformity in the recruitment all over Rajasthan so as to prevent the misuse of the office.
Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. And Ors vs State Of Haryana on 4 October, 1978
In this connection, learned Counsel has invited our attention to M/s. Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Haryana AIR 1979 SC 1149. wherein it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that such a provision is directory and not mandatory. Therefore, so far as the competence of the State Government in framing these Rules is concerned, there is no two opinion and the State Government is competent to frame such Rules. But the question is as to whether the State Government has abdicated the essential legislative function, or not. Under Section 79 it is the State Government which has to frame the rules in the purported exercise of its power and these is no question of abdication of the essential legislative function of the State Legislature. The State Legislature by framing the Act of 1959 has conferred a power on the State Government to frame the necessary rules for implementing the purposes of the Act and it only put a rider that such rule shall be laid before the House of State Legislature for not less than fourteen days when the house meets. This condition has been complied with. Therefore, it cannot be said that by framing these Rules, there is abdication of any essential legislative function. The whole argument in this back ground is utterly misconceived. If the Legislature has amended the Act and has conferred any blanket power on the State Government without laying down any guidelines then perhaps it could be said that the State Legislature has abdicated its essential function. The Legislature has already enacted Section 79 of the Act of 1959 and has conferred the power on the State Government to frame the Rules in order to implement the purpose of the Act. That means the State has to frame the necessary rules for implementing the provisions of the Act. The State Govt. in the purported exercise of its power framed the Rules of 1959 and laid down the method by which the recruitment in the Panchayat Samitis shall be made. Section 88 of the Act of 1959 has conferred this power on the District Establishment Committee to make the selections, and the Panchayat Samitis and the Zila Parishads shall appoint the persons on the basis of the selections made by the District Establishment Committees. This is the only requirement under the Act of 1959. The Rules of 1959 also do not go beyond the provisions of the Act nor does it deprive the District Establishment Committee from making the selections nor does it deprives the Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads from making appointment of the candidates so selected by the District Establishment Committees. Therefore, no essential legislative function has been taken away by amending the Rule 17 of the Rules of 1959.
Gurnam Singh And Ors. vs Surjit Singh And Ors. on 5 August, 1974
In the case of Rajvendra and Ors. (supra), this court took the view that when the circular was issued by the State Government directing the District Establishment Committees to make appointment recruitment without there being any power conferred on the State Government, then it was held that such circular is beyond the scope of the provisions of the Rules and as such the same was struck down relying on the decision given in the case of Gurnam Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. 1971 (2) SLR 799. But now the State Government has realised this that the circular issued by the State Government has gone beyond the provisions of the Rules, therefore, the State Government has amended the Rule 17 and inserted the second proviso acquiring the power to give a direction to the District Establishment Committees that they shall make the selections on the basis of the marking formula laid down in the Circular. This acquisition of power by adding the proviso to Rule 17 does not amount to abdication of the essential legislative function of any authority. More-so, it was not out of place to mention here that there are thousands of vacancies of teachers Gr. III available in the various Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads. But there are no guidelines for recruitment to these vacancies for the various District Establishment Committees and a number of cases have come to the notice of this Court that bungling has been made in the recruitment of these teachers. It is common knowledge that at this level the situation is not very happy one and the recruitments have been made without due regard to the merit of the candidates and all sorts of allegations have been made against the recruitments. It is alleged that in the recruitment the political and other power has been playing a big role thereby making the recruitment to these posts arbitrary. Therefore, in such a back-ground when the situation is getting muddier and muddier and in order to avoid this kind of arbitrariness and large scale of bungling being made in the recruitment at this level a need has been felt by the State Government to lay down in arithmetic formula so as to avoid any kind of discretion with these District Establishment Committees. The formula which has been prepared by the Government which shall hereinafter be dealt with leaves little room for the discretion of the District Establishment Committees and lays down the marking system for each of the item so that the candidate can pin point the illegality or irregularity committed by the District Establishment Committee and it is also easier for the courts to scrutinise the same if any illegality is done by an District Establishment Committee the same can conveniently be led bare. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that such amendment of the proviso amounts to abdication of the essential legislative function.
P. Mahendran vs State Of Karnataka on 5 December, 1989
In the case of P. Mahendran (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court took the same view in case of recruitments made under the Karnataka General Service (Motor Vehicles Branch) (Recruitment) Rules, 1962 and it was observed as under:
The Karnataka Excise Act, 1965
Ram Dial And Ors. vs The State Of Punjab on 3 February, 1965
In the case of Ram Dial (supra), the question was regarding removal of member in public interest under Section 14(e) of the Punjab Municipalities Act, 1911 which provided the removal of the incumbent in public interest. But there was no provision of hearing of the member to be removed whereas under Section 16(1) the removal could be for the reasons mentioned in Clauses (a) to (g) and this was also in public interest and it also provided a hearing. Therefore, the question was that whether now far Section 14. could be held to be valid. In that context, it was observed as under: