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R. Pounthai, Wife Of G. Rajaram vs The Co-Operative Tribunal (Special ... on 29 July, 1994 cites

The Collector Of Central Excise, Madras vs M/S. M.M. Rubber & Co. Tamil Nadu on 4 September, 1991

Even after coming to know of the passing of the award, at least on 25.5.1984, the petitioner could have filed an Appeal challenging the award by taking a copy of the award. Admittedly, that was not done. In the back-drop of these facts, the contention of learned Counsel for the petition has to be considered. The facts of the case in Collector of Central Excise v. M.M. Rubber Co. , were that the Collector of Central Excise, as an adjudicating authority had held that the demand from the respondent towards excise duty was barred by limitation and dropped all further proceedings. The copy of the said order was despatched to the respondent on 21.12.1984. The Central Board of Excise and Customs, after consideration of the said order directed the Collector of Central Excise, Madras to file an appeal to the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi. Before the Tribunal, the respondent urged that the relevant date of the Collector's order for the purpose of Sub-section (3) of Section 35-E of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 should be taken as 28.11.1984 and if that be so, the appeal filed was beyond the period of one year from the date of the decision of the adjudicating authority. The date on which the copy of the order was received by the respondent viz. 21.12.1984, was not relevant for the purpose of reckoning the period of limitation in the case of appeal filed by the Collector. As can be seen from the very first paragraph of the said judgment, the short question of law that arose for consideration was as to what was the relevant date for the purpose of calculation of the period of one year, as provided under Sub-section (i) of Section 35-E of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. A careful reading of paragraph 13 of the said Judgment (extracted above) clearly shows that the main consideration was with reference to the starting date of period of limitation for the purpose of filing an appeal. Learned Counsel for the petitioner was laying emphasis on the lines underlined by me in the said paragraph. The said paragraph, if read in its entirety and in the context of facts of that case, does not support the case of the petitioner to say that unless copy of the award was supplied free of cost to the petitioner it is not binding and not conclusive so as to execute the award. Paragraph 18 of the said judgment clarifies the position further. The said paragraph (18) reads thus:
Supreme Court of India Cites 15 - Cited by 55 - Full Document

V.D. M. R. M. M. R. M. Muthiah Chettiar vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras on 14 February, 1969

So far as the party who is affected by the order or decision for seeking his remedies against the same, he should be made aware of passing such order. Therefore, courts have uniformly laid down as a rule of law that for seeking the remedy the limitation starts from the date on which the order was communicated to him or the date on which it was pronounced or published under such circumstances that the parties affected by it have a reasonable opportunity of knowing of passing of the order and what it contains. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive is thus an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be said to have been concluded and binding on him. Otherwise, the party affected by it will have no means of obeying the order or acting in conformity with it or of appealing against it or otherwise having it set. This is based upon, as observed by Rajamannar, C.J., in Muthia Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1951) 1 M.L.J. 417 : I.L.R. 1951 Mad. 815 : 64 L.W. 270 : 19 I.T.R. 402, "a salutary and just principle". The appreciation of this rule so far as the aggrieved party is concerned is not dependent on the provisions of the particular statute, but is so under the general law.
Supreme Court of India Cites 19 - Cited by 91 - J C Shah - Full Document

M.C.T.M. Corporation, By Director ... vs Income-Tax Officer And Anr. on 17 January, 1958

In same case the Supreme Court relied on the decision of this Court in Muthia Cheuiar v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1951) 1 M.L.J. 417 : 1.L.R. 1951 Mad. 815 : 1951 M.W.N. 257 : 64 L.W. 270 : 19 I.T.R. 402, wherein the applicant/assessee filed an application before the Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 33-A(2) of the Income Tax (1922) for revision of the order dated 18.2.1949. The said application was rejected in limine, as barred by time. According to the petitioner, the order sought to be revised was received by him only on 25.2.1948. Therefore, he filed a writ petition, seeking a writ of mandamus in this Court to the Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, directing him to entertain his application and to dispose of it in accordance with law contending that the application filed was well within time from the dale of receipt of the copy of the assessment order by him. The only question that arose for consideration was whether the one year was to be computed from the date when the order was signed by the Income Tax Officer or from the date when it was communicated to the petitioner. In paragraph 3 of the said decision, it is stated that if a person is given a right to resort to the remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a prescribed time, limitation should not be computed from a date earlier than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew of the order or had an opportunity of knowing the order.
Madras High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 2 - Full Document
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